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BLAME THIS MESSENGER: SUMMERS ON 
FULLER 
Paul A. LeBel* 
LoN L. FULLER. By RobertS. Summers. Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press. 1984. Pp. xiii, 174. $19.95. 
Publication of the fourth volume in the Jurists: Profiles in Legal 
Theory series, 1 and the first devoted to an American legal philosopher, 
provides an occasion for consideration of more than just the merits or 
deficiencies of this particular work. A comparison of Professor Sum-
mers' addition to the series with the earlier volumes lends itself to re-
flection on the opportunities .and responsibilities of the series' 
contributors, and the comparison may also reveal something about the 
nature of legal philosophy in this country. Ac9ordingly, the plan for 
this review of Summers' tribute (p. vii) to Lon Fuller is first, to indi-
cate the role that the Jurists series can play, second, to suggest some of 
the ways in which the Summers book fails to fill that role, and third, to 
offer a very general critique of the agenda that American legal philoso-
phy has set for itself. 
I 
The historian of philosophy of law confronts at the outset a meth-
odological choice between different principles upon which to structure 
his presentation. A philosopher-centered approach will focus on those 
figures who have made major contributions to jurisprudence, while an 
idea-centered model develops the core jurisprudential concepts along 
broad thematic lines. 2 Each of the options carries with it certain risks. 
The former approach, often chronologically ordered, can all too easily 
lapse into a tedious account of the "and then, after Aquinas died ... " 
variety. As the parade of philosophers passes before the reader, the 
impact of the most significant thinkers can be blunted, and the percep-
tion of conceptual unity and clarity can be impeded. The idea-centered 
• Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and 
Mary. A.B. 1971, George Washington University; J.D. 1977, University of Florida. -Ed. 
1. The previous volumes were A. KRONMAN, MAx WEBER (1983), N. MAcCoRMICK, 
H.L.A. HART (1981), and W. MORISON, JOHN AUSTIN (1982). 
2. Books of readings for law school jurisprudence courses are often susceptible to C?tegoriza-
tion along these lines. For an example of a book that primarily takes the philosopher-centered 
approach, see G. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE: TExT AND READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW (1973). F. CoHEN & M. CoHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSo-
PHY (P. Sbuchman ed. 1979), is predominantly an idea-centered anthology, as is LoRD LLOYD 
OF HAMPSTEAD, INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1979) . 
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approach, on the other hand, can misleadingly convey jurisprudential 
ideas as full-blown entities at the expense of an understanding or ap-
preciation of incremental developments in the process of "doing" ju-
risprudence, i.e., of thinking about the nature of law.3 
In structuring each of the early volumes of the series around a 
single figure,4 Jurists offers a promising alternative to the superficial 
surveys that are currently available. There are, however, a number of 
questions that need to be addressed if the series is to achieve its full 
potential as the most important contemporary secondary source on 
jurisprudence readily accessible to the nonspecialist reader. In this 
section of the review, I will identify some of the questions that appear 
not to have been satisfactorily resolved to date, including: what is the 
audience for the series, what is the mission of the individual volumes, 
and how should the match between subject and author be made. While 
I offer tentative suggestions about the lines along which answers could 
be developed, more comprehensive responses must await the attention 
of those scholars with a deeper and wider background in the field. 
What is the audience of the series? 
The choice of the subjects and authors for individual volumes and 
the substance of the individual volumes necessarily depend on the un-
derlying conception of the audience to which the series is addressed. 
In suggesting that the volumes "are intended as reflective essays rather 
than as comprehensive monographs," Professor Twining, the general 
editor of the series, may be trying to reach the reader with some so-
phistication in the field while still offering the neophyte a "short, au-
thoritative, reflective introduction[ ]."5 However admirable the goal 
of providing something for everyone, either the series as a whole or 
particular volumes could fall into the gap between those two potential 
readerships. 
The series got off to an impressive start, and set a correspondingly 
high standard for future volumes, with the MacCormick study of 
H.L.A. Hart.6 One may wonder how a study of the philosopher who 
rescued legal positivism from the immature perspective of the impera-
tive theorists such as John Austin and from the internal inconsisten-
cies of Hans Kelsen could go astray, but I suspect that MacCormick's 
3. The standard texts for student use attempt to incorporate both approaches, but run a 
considerable risk of doing neither very well. See, e.g., E. BoDENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: THE 
PHILOSOPHY AND MErnoD OF TilE LAW (rev. ed. 1974); E. PATIERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: 
MEN AND IDEAS OF mE LAW (1953). 
4. Later volumes may not be structured in this way. In his General Preface to the series, 
Professor Twining stated: ''The conception of the series is sufficiently broad to include studies of 
groups of thinkers and even of single works." Twining, General Preface, in N. MAcCORMICK, 
H.L.A. HART (1981). 
5. Id. 
6. See N. MAcCoRMICK, supra note 1. 
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work has something in common with the play of the greatest athletes: 
they make the difficult look easy, and thus may create the risk of being 
under-appreciated. To a presentation of Hart's major themes that is 
both lucid and faithful to the original, MacCormick has added a suc-
cinct and cogent appraisal as well as an extension of some of Hart's 
major ideas. 7 The student beginning the study of jurisprudence could 
use the MacCormick volume to test his or her own understanding of 
Hart, while the reader with a more fully developed critical attitude 
toward Hart can easily benefit from an exposure to MacCormick's 
insights. 
The next two volumes in the series played a somewhat different 
role. MacCormick's reflections on Hart were a valuable complement 
to the original work, but the ultimate force of the volume was 
centrifugal, pushing the reader outward toward study of the works of 
Hart. The Morison and Kronman volumes have more of a centripetal 
force, and can be viewed more as substitutes for, rather than comple-
ments to, direct study of the original work of their subjects. The pri-
mary work of both Austin and Weber is, I suspect, too often either 
read in abbreviated excerpts or ignored entirely in the basic jurispru-
dence course. 8 Lengthy exposure to Austin's major work9 is undoubt-
edly deterred by what Lon Fuller has described as "what may well be 
the dreariest prose ever penned by man."10 Weber is not sufficiently a 
philosopher oflaw qua law, and his theory oflaw is either so scattered 
across the range of his work or so buried in the "dense prose" of the 
Sociology of Law, 11 that the reader without a broad base in philosophy 
and sociology may be reluctant to venture onto what appears to be 
treacherous ground. Although not wishing to be cast in the role of 
encouraging reliance on secondary works as a substitute for careful 
scrutiny of the original work of important scholars, I suspect that each 
of these volumes, albeit in different ways, interjects into the basic 
study of jurisprudence a more rigorous explication of these scholars' 
contributions than their work might receive on its own. 
1. In so doing, MacCormick has made accessible to a wider audience the significant scholar-
ship contained in his earlier work, LEGAL REAsoNING AND LEGAL THEORY (1978). 
8. Of the works cited at note 2 supra, the Cohen and Cohen book has a 20-page excerpt from 
Austin, F. CoHEN & M. CoHEN, supra note 2, at 8-28, but nothing from Weber. Lloyd includes 
17 pages from Austin, LoRD LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD, supra note 2, at 19-21 & 223-37, and none 
from Weber, although Weber is given a brief textual discussion. Id. at 350-51. In keeping with 
his practice of providing the student with lengthy excerpts from the philosophers who are in-
cluded in his book, Christie provides over 120 pages excerpted from Austin, G. CH!usTIE, supra 
note 2, at 471-594, but nothing from Weber. 
9. J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURlSPRUDENCE DETERMINED (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1954). 
10. L. FuLLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURlSPRUoENCE 103 (temp. ed. 1949). 
11. See A. KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 1. 
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. What is the goal of the individual volume? 
These remarks on the earlier volumes in the Jurists series indicate 
that the purpose of the individual volumes is dependent upon, and 
should vary according to, the extent to which the original work of the 
subject is (a) inaccessible and (b) likely to require such an interdiscipli-
nary background as to present a forbidding facade to the uninitiated 
reader. When the barriers appear to be formidable, the authors of Ju-
rist volumes have an opportunity to carve out handholds that facilitate 
surmounting the barriers, thus opening up intellectual terrain that 
might otherwise go unexplored. By adding to the richness and variety 
of the encounter with jurisprudential matters, series volumes that 
widen the scope of the reader's exposure serve a valuable purpose. 12 
Authors of series volumes about writers such as Fuller, whose 
work is readily available to contemporary audiences and is written in a 
manner that invites rather than deters comprehension (p. 15), are in 
large measure relieved of the path-breaking tasks imposed on authors 
who address the more obscure, if not obscurantist, works of legal phi-
losophers. Although path-breaking may not be a necessary function 
when· writing about the more accessible figures, indicating a route 
through a body of worK. may still be an important contribution to a 
wider and deeper understanding of the work, particularly when it cov-
ers a broad spectrum of topics. 
Certain general responsibilities are inherent in writing for an audi-
ence composed in part of readers who may be using a volume in this 
series to guide ~m initial exploration of the work of a legal philosopher. 
Professor Twining has noted his request that contributors "set their 
subjects in the context of their times and specific concerns," and "be 
scrupulously fair in interpretation but not . . . inhibited in expressing 
their own opinions."13 Both backward- and forward-looking evalua-
tion may be beyond the capability of the reader drawing initially on 
his or her own resources. Identification of the intellectual currents out 
of wliich the subject's work emerged, and from which it diverged, is a 
service the author needs to provide, along with a demonstration of 
how the work has affected, or is likely to affect, the future course of 
developments. 
What qualities should be sought in the authors? 
The tasks described in the preceding section call for a variety of 
skills. The sine qua non is, of course, a thorough mastery of the work 
of the subject of the volume. Without a firm grasp of the full oeuvre of 
12. The goal of expanding the range of tools with which the reader thinks about law and 
legal problems suggests that as the series includes volumes that are not philosopher-centered, a 
promising line to pursue would be some of the "law and .•• " subjects, chief among them being 
law and economics. 
13. See Twining, supra note 4. 
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the subject, 14 the author of even these short reflective introductions15 
will be unable to appreciate how the diverse strands of the work might 
form a pattern that will make it easier to assess the significance of the 
subject's thought. 
Nearly as important as an understanding of the work of the subject 
is a familiarity with the milieu in which the work took place. An au-
thor would be seriously handicapped in trying to explain Hart without 
at least a basic appreciation of the linguistic and analytical philosophy 
being done at Oxford, 16 or in attempting to assess Austin's significance 
without locating his work within the utilitarian circle that influenced 
and supported that work.17 
This series demands more than just reporting or paraphrasing if it 
is to achieve its full potential. The authors must·bring to bear on their 
subjects an independent intelligence that Professor Twining describes 
as "sympathetically critical."18 Synthesizing· various themes, rerout-
ing lines of argument around pitfalls, carrying an argument through 
the next stages of development - these tasks require that the authors 
be substantial scholars in their own right. 
II 
Measured against the level of performance of the first three 
volumes in the series, or evaluated in terms of the questions raised in 
the preceding section of this review, Professor Summers' contribution 
is a seriously flawed work that will not enhance the reputation of the 
Jurists series. Perhaps the most striking feature of the volume is the 
choice of Summers as the author of a volume on Fuller. For at least 
two major reasons, Summers would not appear to be an obvious candi-
date for the role. First, as Summers himself acknowledges at the out-
set of the book (p. vii), a sympathetic account of Fuller's work marks a 
departure from his earlier treatment of Fuller. 19 Second, Summers' 
14. Writing about living legal philosophers presents obvious difficulties that are not present 
when the body of work is closed, but it may present opportunities as well. An active scholar may 
become so focused on details that not only does the forest disappear, but the recognition of the 
trees as well might be prevented because of an inability to see anything but individual leaves. An 
objective evaluation of one's work to date has the potential of providing an illuminating perspec-
tive that the scholar might not otherwise receive from critiques that are as much directed at the 
details as is the work being evaluated. 
15. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. 
16. SeeN. MAcCoRMICK, supra note 1, at 12-19. 
17. See W. MORISON, supra note 1, at 38-60. 
18. See Twining, supra note 4. 
19. Compare Summers, Professor Fuller on Morality and Law, 18 J. LEGAL Eouc. 1 (1965), 
reprinted in R. SUMMERS, MoRE EssAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: GENERAL AssESSMENTS OF 
LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 101 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Summers, Morality], with Summers, Pro-
fessor Fuller's Jurisprudence and America's Dominant Philosophy of Law, 92 HARv. L. REv. 433 
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Summers, Dominant Philosophy]. 
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views of American legal philosophy20 are sufficiently idiosyncratic that 
one might view with some suspicion his selection as a contributor to a 
series such as Jurists. Neither one of these points necessarily disquali-
fies Summers from contributing a volume on Fuller to the Jurists se-
ries. Nor do I mean to suggest that there is not a good deal that is of 
value in this book. However, a consideration of these two points 
reveals, and perhaps explains, a number of the major flaws in Lon L. 
Fuller. 
As noted before,21 Professor Twining has asked contributors "to be 
sympathetically critical" of their subjects. Summers refers to his ac-
count as "decidedly sympathetic,"22 and describes a rereading of the 
entire body of Fuller's work (apparently as part of the preparation of 
his Instrumentalism treatise)23 as provoking a heightened regard for 
Fuller's contribution to legal theory (p. vii). In theory, at least, this 
process of undergoing a growing appreciation for the work of the sub-
ject offers an opportunity for the reader of this book to experience 
second-hand the observations and insights that raised Fuller's stature 
in the eyes of the author. But such a process holds out that opportu-
nity only at the price of creating a pair of risks that Summers is not 
always able to avoid. 
The first and more serious risk is that the author who, over time, 
comes to a conclusion different from one he had held at an earlier date 
will overreact to the change in position. The critic converted to sup-
porter may assume the mantle of the hagiographer. While Summers 
usually keeps his enthusiasm under restraint,24 there are instances of 
gushing overstatement that raise at least some warning signs about 
Summers' ability to present an objective appraisal of his subject. In 
his concluding chapter, Summers refers to Fuller as "the greatest 
proceduralist in the history of legal theory" (p. 151). While philoso-
phy of law does not seem to me to be an activity that lends itself to the 
kinds of comparisons more appropriately made about left-handed 
pitchers, one who makes statements of this sort at least ought to recog-
nize how the evaluation is undercut by other statements he has made. 
For example, Summers earlier states: 
Fuller did not develop a systematic account of the purposes that are es-
sential to the definition of each basic process. Nor did he explain very 
fully how far a necessary purpose may fail of embodiment or implemen-
tation before we can say the process no longer exists, or has become 
20. See R. SUMMERS, INSfRUMENTALlSM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982). 
21. See notes 13, 18 supra. 
22. P. vii (emphasis added). 
23. See note 20 supra. 
24. Summers qualifies many of his assessments of Fuller. Fuller is described, for example, as 
"[i]n his time • • . the leading standard-bearer of secular 'natural law' theory in the English-
speaking world." P. 1 (emphasis added). 
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some other kind of process. But he did offer many remarks on the pur-
poses of different processes .... [Pp. 31-32.] 
There is quite a gap between offering "remarks" on process and being 
the greatest proceduralist in history, and in chapters devoted to 
Fuller's work on legal processes, Summers simply fails to sustain 
Fuller in the exalted position to which the concluding chapter elevates 
him. 
The other risk that is presented in an account by a convert is that 
the process of conversion can be glossed over, with the new under-
standing or appreciation presented as a fait accompli. I suspect that 
the reader would have benefited from a more thorough explanation of 
what deficiencies the author had previously identified in Fuller's work, 
and precisely how the rereading changed or corrected the earlier 
views, or made the earlier objections less significant. 
In an earlier appraisal of the first edition of Fuller's The Morality 
of Law, 25 Summers concluded that Fuller had failed to establish that a 
set of legality principles had to be characterized as moral principles.26 
That criticism, if well supported, should strike at the heart of Fuller's 
development of "the inner morality of law."27 In this book, Summers 
apparently has come around to the view that Fuller's purported mo-
rality is a morality (pp. 33-41), but Summers' method of arriving at 
that conclusion is not a service to Fuller or to the reader trying to 
grasp the significance of the morality designation. 
Summers first collapses the idea ~hat legality principles can consti-
tute a morality into the idea that the legality principles "necessarily 
translate into principles or values of moral worth" (p. 37). Then, 
while acknowledging that the move is his rather than Fuller's, Sum-
mers identifies the citizen's "fair opportunity to obey the law"28 as the 
moral value that is secured by compliance with Fuller's principles of 
legality. Summers attempts to reinforce this argument from fairness 
with an argument from legitimacy. If a "lawgiver violates the princi-
ples oflegality, . . . the lawgiver . . . necessarily forfeits some govern-
mental legitimacy. . . . Legitimacy is itself a moral value" (p. 38). 
Left unstated is the basis on which the values Summers identifies as-
sume the guise of moral values. 
The arbitrariness of Summers' bridging of the gap between legal 
principles and moral principles is demonstrated by his consideration of 
a criticism that was directed at Fuller's principles. Summers cites an 
exchange between Fuller and Wolfgang Friedmann in which Fuller 
resists Friedmann's characterization of Fuller's principles as " 'mere 
25. L. FuLLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969) (1st ed. 1964). 
26. Summers, Morality, supra note 19, at 127-30. 
27. L. Fuller, supra note 25, at 42. 
28. P. 37 (emphasis in original). 
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conditions of efficacy' " (p. 37). Yet Summers himself had earlier 
written: 
A further reason for refusing to apply the halo word "morality" to the 
author's principles of legality is that there is an apposite alternative: 
They may be viewed as "maxims of legal efficacy" and maxims of this 
nature are not, as such, conceptually connected with morality. If a per-
son assembles a machine inefficiently, the result is inefficiency, not 
immorality.29 
If Summers' facile equation of the fairness of an opportunity to obey 
the law and governmental legitimacy with morality is sufficient to turn 
Fuller's principles into a morality oflaw, then the obvious step to have 
taken would have been to state simply that inefficiency is immoral. 
Labelling something moral is no more persuasive when done at one 
remove, as Summers does, than when done directly, as Fuller did. 
Summers recognizes in passing that the notion of "what ought to be" 
is a notion "of some appropriate person or body" (p. 34), but the stan-
dard of appropriateness is not provided. Furthermore, recognizing 
that "legal standards of content are frequently moral in character" (p. 
35) tells us nothing about which standards have that quality. Sum-
mers' hypothesis that a necessary connection between validity and mo-
rality exists "[w]henever a rule, to qualify as valid law, must satisfy 
tests of moral worth specified in standards of legal validity" (p. 35) 
displays the twin failings of his attempt to protect natural law theory 
from inanity: the ignoring of the necessity of human agency in the 
formulation of a standard of validity that includes tests of moral 
worth, and the overloading of the definable concept of legal validity 
with indefinite notions of morals. 
The danger that is associated with this moral overloading of valid-
ity is inadvertently displayed by Summers' attempt to extend the ne-
cessity of moral value to legal processes. Summers refers to "genuine 
legislative processes of a democratic kind" as apparently including a 
"right of parties potentially affected by a proposed law to a legislative 
hearing in which they may try to influence the content of the legisla-
tion" (pp. 40-41). For at least seventy years, no such "right" has been 
recognized in this country.30 The question that is necessarily posed to 
those who would infuse morality into validity concepts is whether the 
legislative process in this country is thereby rendered immoral and/ or 
invalid. Summers' designation of the moral values that are secured by 
the principles of legality is of little help in answering this question. A 
hearing right has no effect on a "fair opportunity to obey the law,"31 
but such a right arguably could be part of the contractarian "under-
standing'' that gives a government legitimacy (pp. 38, 84). 
29. Summers, Morality, supra note 19, at 129. 
30. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). 
31. P. 37 (emphasis in original). 
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Summers' view raises a number of questions. What makes an op-
portunity to be heard by a legislature a right? Is it a right because a 
hearing would be moral? I suspect that we would be better off if we 
followed Fuller's lead and identified this procedural step as something 
that ought to be provided. In that way, the proponent of a legislative 
hearing would be able to make the instrumental arguments for the 
desirability of a hearing, and those arguments could be evaluated on 
their merits, without the distraction (and the potential failure) of a 
leap from the undesirability to the immorality of proceeding without a 
legislative hearing. 
Even if we were to accept Summers' implicit conclusion that a leg-
islative process that did not afford a hearing to affected parties is in 
some sense immoral, the consequences of that conclusion are not at all 
clear. Are the enactments of that legislative process invalid, immoral, 
or both? If the members of the legislative body in fact consider all the 
matters that would have been raised in legislative hearings, isn't the 
hearing directed at another goal, namely, the inclusion of the citizenry 
in the process of legislating? Are we then in the position of having to 
add yet another statement to Summers' list of what is moral (e.g., "le-
gitimacy" (p. 38)) and immoral (e.g., "injustice" (p. 37)), to the effect 
that inclusion is a moral value? 
Both Fuller and the reader would be better served by an introduc-
tory essay that is able to convey a deeper understanding of precisely 
what Fuller was trying to do and why it was important. In overcom-
ing his earlier objections to Fuller in the way that he displays in this 
book, Summers proves to be unable to save Fuller from the force of 
those and other objections in any meaningful way. 
The criticisms of the book that center around Summers' blossom-
ing enthusiasm for Fuller as a pivotal figure in jurisprudence provide 
only part of the reason why Summers seems not to have been the ideal 
choice to contribute a volume on Fuller to the Jurists series. A differ-
ent set of criticisms, derived from Summers' attempts to develop a uni-
fied view of American legal theory, raises equally serious questions 
about the Summers book. 
During the course of the past decade, Professor Summers has de-
veloped at considerable length, 32 and with no small degree of sophisti-
cation, his hypothesis that the work of many prominent American 
legal theorists of the first half of this century33 reflects a sort of 
prototheory of law which he labels "pragmatic instrumentalism."34 
32. See R. SUMMERS, supra note 20. 
33. See id. at 22-26. 
34. I do not understand Summers to be suggesting that a fully developed theory of law can be 
found in the work of those theorists he identifies as pragmatic instrumentalists. Indeed, such a 
suggestion would fly in the face of such disclaimers as that issued by Llewellyn, Some Realism 
about Realism- Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1222 (1931). What Summers 
appears instead to be doing is identifying certain concerns common to this set of theorists, and 
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His fresh perspective on a group of scholars who have usually been 
categorized as the American legal realists is bound to produce both a 
renewed interest in this group of theorists and a heightened awareness 
of the need to explore the responsibilities and consequences of operat-
ing at the level ofmetatheory.35 However one might agree or disagree 
with Summers' work on pragmatic instrumentalism, jurisprudence as 
a whole should benefit from his efforts. 
When Summers turns from his pet theory to the work of someone 
who by all reasonable reckoning was outside of the movement, a po-
tential trap is set for the reader who is unaware of the peculiar per-
spective from which Summers views American legal theory. In his 
1978 essay on Fuller and the pragmatic instrumentalists, Summers 
noted the desirability of accommodating Fuller's views within that 
theory oflaw.36 Four years later, Summers described Fuller as a ma-
jor critic of American pragmatic instrumentalism.37 Now, in a book 
purporting to be about Fuller, Summers states that "Fuller stood . . . 
on the side of the instrumentalists," but he simply "did not belong to 
the realist wing of American pragmatic instrumentalism" (p. 4). The 
reader who is attempting to obtain an understanding of Fuller must 
consider the possibility that Fuller's views have undergone at least 
some distortion in order to enable Summers to bring Fuller into a non-
realist "wing of American pragmatic instrumentalism."38 Without 
further warning or background, the reader is unable to separate what 
is uniquely Summers' from a more mainstream depiction of the legal 
and philosophical environment in which Fuller participated and 
against which he reacted. 39 
then developing on his own "something that qualifies as a general theory." R. SUMMERS, supra 
note 20, at 11 (emphasis in original). 
35. Compare Moore, The Need for a Theory of Legal Theories: Assessing Pragmatic Instru· 
mentalism, 69 CoRNELL L. REv. 988 (1984), with Summers, On Identifying and Reconstructing a 
General Legal Theory- Some Thoughts Prompted by Professor Moore's Critique, 69 CoRNELL L. 
REv. 1014 (1984). 
36. See Summers, Dominant Philosophy, supra note 19, at 433. 
37. See R. SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 38. 
38. Even if the change has occurred in Summers' conception of his theory, if all he is doing is 
conflating instrumentalism with antiformalism, Summers achieves the integration of Fuller into 
the instrumentalist camp only at the debasement of the theory. Ironically, this is a risk that 
Summers appears to have recognized in 1978. See Summers, Dominant Philosophy, supra note 
19, at 433. Fuller can be classified as an instrumentalist, see R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY 4 (1977), but even that term begins to lose its significance if it begins to be used so 
that it encompasses anyone who thinks law has a purpose. 
39. I do not mean to suggest that Summers should be precluded from offering his own in· 
sights into Fuller's work, particularly insights that reflect Summers' development of the prag· 
matic instrumentalist theory. Both MacCormick and Morison provide good illustrations of how 
carefully developed original insights can add to the depth and sophistication of the reader's un-
derstanding of the subject. See, e.g., N. MAcCoRMICK, supra note 1, at 96-102, 111-20; W. 
MoRISON, supra note 1, at 178-205. What is essential for an introductory treatment of the sort 
proper for a volume in this series is a demarcation of the line between the views of the subject and 
the views of the author that is discernible by the reader who lacks a familiarity with the works of 
both. 
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The most serious (and the most inexcusable) shortcoming of Sum-
mers' book lies in his description of the major legal theory which 
Fuller opposed and as an alternative to which he offered his version of 
a natural law theory. No account of Fuller that purports to place 
Fuller "in the context of [his] times and specific concerns"40 can avoid 
at least a general description of legal positivism. Indeed, Summers un-
dertakes a description of this view of law even prior to his presentation 
of Fuller's own theory of law, in the belief that "this view as Fuller 
conceived it will help us to understand why this general issue was such 
a live one for him, and why his own theory cannot be dismissed as 
platitudinous" (p. 16). 
However, no book that is likely to find its way into the hands of a 
reader who is relying on the book as part of an initial exposure to 
jurisprudence ought to be permitted to present such a distorted view of 
legal positivism as Summers provides here. Even when the distortion 
is Fuller's, 41 one of the responsibilities of the author of an introductory 
text such as this is to correct the misperceptions of the terms of the 
dispute created by the subject's misstatements and oversimplifications 
of the opposing view. Otherwise, Fuller's theory would need to be 
rescued not from dismissal as "platitudinous" but rather from the 
charge that the theory is a trivial response to a positivist straw-man 
with no realistic counterpart in contemporary legal thought. 
At the heart of Summers' distortion of legal positivism is an inex-
plicable failure to comprehend the meaning that positivists attach to 
the term "validity." Summers argues that a "source-based" test of 
validity fails to capture the extent to which content is actually relevant 
to the validity of "a lower-tier precept" (p. 44). As evidence of this 
failure, Summers describes the apparent conflict between the source-
based validity and the content-based validity of an unconscionable 
contract, a will that conflicts with state governmental policy, an arbi-
trarily discriminatory statute, and a judicial precedent that is not 
"good law" (p. 45). Setting aside for the moment the last example, 
which is subject to its own peculiar difficulties, 42 each of the so-called 
40. See text at note 13 supra. 
41. In his initial description, Summers states that he is presenting a look at positivism "as 
Fuller conceived it." P. 16. In his later, more fully developed treatment, Summers attributes to 
Fuller the thesis that "the positivist quest for a general criterion by which the law could be 
identified and differentiated must fail," and states that because "Fuller did not develop the [the-
sis] as fully as he might have," Summers will attempt "to elaborate it here faithfully to his evi-
dent intuitions (and also in a manner largely consistent with the anti-positivism of Dworkin)." 
P. 42. 
42. The meaning Summers assigns to the phrase "good law" displays some of the difficulties 
of his attempt to portray the theory of judicial decisionmaking in a negative, anti positivist mold. 
Earlier in the book, Summers appears to be including the test of "a precedent for minimal 'good-
ness' ('Is that good law?')" within those content standards which are based on morality. P. 35. 
There and at this point in the book, Summers seems merely to be misusing the term "good law" 
as a synonym for binding precedent that provides the solution to the dispute before the court. 
However, Summers shortly thereafter makes it clear that the apparent confusion is in fact delib-
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content-oriented tests of legal validity is itself dependent on what a 
positivist would have no difficulty describing as a source-based legally 
valid rule. Contracts are unenforceable because of a legal rule of un-
conscionability,43 wills violate state governmental policy embodied in 
properly enacted statutes,44 and statutes are set aside as discriminatory 
under a federal or state constitutional provision.45 Summers fails to 
distinguish between the validity of rules, which positivists purport to 
be able to determine on a source-based standard, and the validity of 
public and private acts, which must of course include reference to con-
tent-oriented standards, but to such standards as are found in or infer-
able from legally valid rules. 
The more significant conceptual and practical questions tum on 
the issue of how legal decisionmakers can and should select the con-
tent for specific rules and decisions. Presenting this issue as part of an 
anti positivist agenda (pp. 54-57) entangles the reader in a law /moral-
ity dichotomy that need not be part of either the positivist or the natu-
ral law program. Summers describes the impossibility of 
differentiating legal argumentation from moral argumentation (p. 55). 
A differentiation can, of course, be made, but the questions become 
why one would want to make the differentiation, and what one has 
sought to prove by the distinction. 
The distinction I would draw is based on use rather than content. 
Legal argumentation consists of reasoning offered to affect a decision 
by a legal decisionmaker. Within such argumentation, reasons derived 
from various sources will have room to operate depending on the par-
ticular hierarchy of persuasiveness that has been established within the 
system. If the reason for distinguishing legal from moral argumenta-
tion is to suggest that positivists ignore the latter, the suggestion is 
absurd. It is true, however, that within the sphere of legal argumenta-
tion, reasons will have different weights, and decisionmakers will have 
varying degrees of freedom to follow certain reasons. Without an un-
derstanding of the hierarchical structure of rules within a legal system, 
both the observer and the participant will be totally unequipped to 
erate, that "the standard of sufficient goodness is largely determined by moral notions," and that 
the legal validity of a precedent depends on its becoming "settled" by passing a test that is based 
in part on "general moral ideas of sufficient goodness 'outside the law' on which such standards 
must continuously draw." P. 55. This exercise might have some point if Summers were ap· 
preaching the issue that contemporary legal philosophers have joined under the headings of the 
meaning of judicial discretion and whether legal questions always have right answers. See, e.g., 
R. DWORKIN, supra note 38, at 31-39, 81-130; Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in LAW, MORALITY, 
AND SOCIETY: EssAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 58-84 (P. Hacker & J. Raz eds. 1977). 
Summers indicates, however, that this is not Fuller's primary concern, p. 51, and thus the pur-
pose seems to be simply to offer a further attack on the positivist straw-man whose theory oflegal 
validity is unconcerned with content. P. 54. 
43. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (1972). 
44. See, e.g., T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 135-38 (2d ed. 1953) (dis-
cussing the policy underlying statutes setting restrictions on charitable and religious devices). 
45. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 991-1146 (1978). 
February 1985] Summers on Fuller 729 
understand to whom arguments should be addressed and along what 
lines they should be structured in order to be most effective. 
Summers' attempt to use the experience of the common law as 
proof of the failure of the positivist quest involves him in a convoluted 
tangle of uses of the word "law" that might well be better abandoned 
than sorted out. The steps in the argument (p. 50) are essentially 
these: (1) Common-law rules owe their status as law to "general ac-
ceptance and rational appeal," rather than to their "having been laid 
down by prior judges;" (2) common-law rules are "sufficiently good to 
become 'settled' law and therefore truly law" when their rational ap-
peal "to subsequent judges and to the legal profession at large" gives 
them a certain level of acceptance;46 (3) common-law rules have the 
status of law even before a judicial decision because (and here Sum-
mers must be quoted lest the reviewer be accused of intentionally par-
odying his views) 
in my view, the grounds on which interpretational notions, custom, and 
common law are received are very largely generalizable, are in fact so 
generalized, and are widely understood within at least the legal profes-
sion. Thus for the law to be knowable in advance, it is simply not neces-
sary to have the kind of system for which so many positivists seem to 
have yearned - a system in which law is identifiable preferably by refer-
ence to the antecedent and authentic stamp of some authoritative origi-
nator. Law can be sufficiently identified by other means.47 
Summers' argument can be tested by taking a fairly common situa-
tion and seeing where the steps of his reasoning lead. Driver A and 
driver B are in a two-car collision, in which B struck A's car from the 
rear, and B wishes to sue A for damages for the personal injuries and 
property damage suffered in the accident. The supreme court of the 
state in which the accident occurred has consistently held to a com-
mon-law rule of contributory negligence. In recent years, nearly two-
thirds of the states have replaced contributory negligence with one of 
three different forms of comparative negligence. The legislature of our 
hypothetical state has considered but not enacted a comparative negli-
gence bill in each of its last three sessions. In such a state of affairs, it 
is difficult to believe that anyone could seriously contend that "the 
law" in this jurisdiction is anything other than the most recent pro-
nouncement to have received the "antecedent and authentic stamp of 
some authoritative originator." If the state supreme court were to de-
cide tomorrow to adopt a system of comparative negligence, would 
that be the law of the state because of its "general acceptance and 
rational appeal"? Would it become "good" or "settled" law only 
when its rational appeal "to the legal profession at large" has pro-
46. This point is developed in a much more sophisticated manner by Ronald Dworkin as a 
matter of tbe "gravitational force" of common law precedents. See R. DwoRKIN, supra note 38, 
at 110-23. 
47. P. 50 (emphasis in original). 
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duced an (unspecified) level of acceptance? And before the court an-
nounced the comparative negligence rule, did that rule have the status 
of law because it was "knowable in advance" at least within those seg-
ments of the legal profession which could see it coming? 
Summers sketches a view of law by Gallup poll and horoscope. If 
this be the alternative to positivism, give me positivism! I may thereby 
reveal that I am deluding myself that I am "value-neutral" (p. 52), 
show myself to be a moral skeptic (pp. 52-53), and demonstrate that I 
am unhealthily preoccupied with a theory that does not fit the facts (p. 
53). But I also know how B's case is going to be decided by a trial 
court, to whom B should address arguments for change, and the bind-
ing effect of the change if it should occur. Failure to adopt Summers' 
open-ended view of law does not in any way concede that the role of a 
judge is "simply to do or die and seldom to reason why; his is gener-
ally to be an uncreative role" (p. 60). Yet that creativity takes place 
within limits and subject to constraints. The distorted view of positiv-
ism Summers offers here is a poor substitute for a reasoned exploration 
of the nature and location of those limits, and serves not at all the 
important task of introducing the reader to what is significant in 
Fuller's rejection of positivism. 
III 
The portrayal of Lon Fuller as one of the most influential Ameri-
can legal theorists of this century calls for some concluding thoughts 
on what Fuller's work indicates about the agenda that American legal 
theory addressed during the period of Fuller's work. In order to assess 
the accomplishments of legal theory as represented in Fuller's writing, 
a distinction between the reactive and the positive segments of that 
work will be useful. 
To the extent that Fuller's writing is reacting to what Summers 
sees as a scientific mindset (pp. 53, 57, 63), it displays an essentially 
sterile strain of American legal theory. The late nineteenth-century 
legal science movement in this country was fundamentally different 
from such later developments as Kelsen's pure theory of law. The 
American legal scientists were essentially not concerned with the na-
ture of law as a philosophical or intellectual phenomenon. Rather, 
they were developing a formalistic method of legal decisionmaking 
that would confine the decisionmakers within the parameters of syllo-
gistic reasoning from a major premise that could be located in the rele-
vant statutory or appellate case law. The realists reacted strongly and 
effectively to that concept of decisionmaking. American legal philoso-
phy outside of the "realist wing" (p. 4) makes no significant contribu-
tion if all it does is belabor the same point made by the realists. 
Even the secular natural law which Fuller could have offered as an 
alternative to the more sophisticated positivism of the post-realist era 
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is essentially negative in character. Fuller's inner morality of law en-
ables us to identify putative legal systems that are not what they seem 
to be (p. ·n), but neither the observer nor the participant is otherwise 
given standards against which to measure the validity of particular 
enactments or pronouncements about individual laws. The barrenness 
of Fuller's natural law is most apparent when compared with the crea-
tive work of a natural law proponent such as Ronald Dworkin, ad-
dressing the nature of judicial decisionmaking in light of a 
constructive model for r~ching correct results. 
Fuller's impressive studies of processes are a positive contribution 
to our understanding of the possibilities and the limits of different 
decisionmaking and ordering techniques. Such work, however valua-
ble and illuminating it may be, is only tangentially jurisprudential in 
nature, unless the concept of jurisprudence is so broadened that it in-
cludes all discussion of conflict resolution and resource allocation. 
Fuller's views on custom, for example, undouptedly increase our ap-
preciation of how individuals behave, but to say "that he expanded our 
very concept of law" (p. 78) is to perpetuate the antipositivist di-
lemma, i.e., if we cannot and should not distinguish law from non-law, 
who can object to the proposition that everything is law? 
Summers' over-playing of the antipositivist vein in Fuller's work 
creates a risk that Fuller and the bulk of midcentury American legal 
theory will be dismissed as irrelevant. As long as American legal the-
ory concerns itself excessively with attacks on a legal positivism resem-
bling the simplistic notions of Austin (pp. 48-50), and offers only an 
amorphous and indeterminate "morality" as the reference criterion for 
decisions of difficult and controversial issues (chs. 3-4), the philosophy 
of law generated in this country is likely to lag considerably behind its 
British and Continental counterparts. 
In his earlier text on ~erican legal theory, Professor Summers 
distinguished the fox from the hedgehog, and adopted the stance of the 
hedgehog which knows one great thing or which has the best trick of 
all.48 Considering the fundamentally unsound nature of Summers' in-
troduction of the work of Lon Fuller, I suspect that both the subject 
and the readers of the Jurists series would have been better served had 
the hedgehog stuck to his pragmatic instrumentalist trick. 
48. See R. SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 13. The image is developed with considerable rich-
ness in I. BERLIN, RUSSIAN THINKERS 22-81 (H. Hardy ed. 1978). 
THE MORALITY OF OBEDIENCE 
Joseph Raz* 
A THEORY OF LAw. By Philip Soper. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 1984. Pp. ix, 190. $16.50. 
Over the past few years Professor Soper has published several arti-
cles displaying an acute power of analysis, a fair-minded treatment of 
the views of theorists for whom he has little sympathy, and a capacity 
to cut through the detail of complex arguments and reach to their 
heart. 1 In them he was moving towards an independent stance. This 
elegantly written book contains the fruit of this search. 
The book can be divided into three parts. The first, mainly in 
chapter one, discusses method in legal philosophy. The second, con-
sisting mainly of chapters two and five, unravels Soper's views on the 
nature of law. The third, mainly in chapter three, is a completely new 
argument for the existence of an obligation to obey the law- any law, 
be it good or bad, just or unjust. Chapters four and six interpret and 
support defenses of the novel doctrines advanced in the rest of the 
book. Each of the main themes is introduced through a discussion of 
the work of some of the theorists Soper disagrees with. The book in all 
its parts is Soper's response to the challenge he addresses to all legal 
and political theorists: What is the difference between law and a 
merely coercive order? All other theories are found wanting. Either 
they fail to identify the difference or they fail to explain it, they fail to 
see its point. Soper's ambition is to remedy both defects. I will not try 
to summarise the book, but will concentrate on the main message con-
veyed by each of its parts. 
I. PROBLEMS OF METHOD 
Soper's novel theory of law belongs to the recently fast-expanding 
family of theories holding that the answer to the question "what is 
law?" depends at least in part on evaluative considerations. But per-
haps uniquely among adherents of this approach, he believes in the 
viability of the alternative approach. It is possible, he implies, though 
pointless, to inquire into the question "what is law?" in a way that is 
devoid of evaluative presuppositions. It is here, I shall argue, that he 
* Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. D.Phil. 1967. - Ed. 
1. See, e.g., Soper, Legal Theory and the Problem of Definition (Book Review), 50 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 1170 (1983); Soper, Metaphor:s and Models of Law: The Judge as Priest, 15 MicH. L. REv. 
1196 (1977); Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, 15 
MICH. L. REv. 473 (1977). 
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goes astray. Perhaps paradoxically, this mistake leads him to misiden-
tify and exaggerate the role of evaluative considerations in a theory of 
law. 
Trouble starts with the first introductory chapter. Soper raises the 
question which has always proved to be the Achilles' heel of philoso-
phy: What is it good for? His answer is that there is no possible point 
to legal philosophy if it is not to answer the question "what ought one 
to do?" From this he concludes without further ado that its task is to 
answer the question: "What is law that I should obey it?" Indeed he 
sees this as no more than a restatement of "what ought I to do?" (p. 
7). The question "what is law?" which is addressed in the rest of the 
book is understood as a quest for such a description of the law which 
will make obedience to it obligatory. The first step towards a theory 
was accomplished. One fundamental tenet of law was discovered: 
Necessarily, law is such that it is obligatory to obey it.2 I shall call this 
Soper's basic maxim. 
Chapters four and six show that he does not regard the method-
ological argument for the basic maxim as sufficient. While the basic 
maxim is one of the main props for his theory of law, its own accept-
ability depends on the acceptability of his legal and political doctrines. 
The whole argument of the book hangs together. One result of this is 
that my strictures on the basic maxim depend on the cogency of my 
rejection of the other theses of the book. Still one has to start some-
where, and what better place can there be than Soper's own starting 
point. 
Soper is quite modest about his claim. He thinks that at the end of 
the day whether or not the law il) such that it is necessarily the case 
that one has an obligation to obey it is like the question whether the 
drawing which can be seen as either duck or rabbit is a drawing of a 
duck or of a rabbit.3 It is not clear, however, whether Soper is really 
seeing a duck or a rabbit. Let us assume that the purpose of legal 
theory is to advance the inquiry into what we ought to do. Does it 
follow th~t describing the essential features of law as a political system 
of authoritative rules, determining, among much else, when the use of 
force is permissible, prejudges the issue (p. 10)? On the contrary, there 
can be no progress in deciding what is to be done in the political 
sphere except by focusing attention on the prominent features of social 
institutions, features which may make a difference to the issue of 
obedience. 
If the law is to be obeyed it is because of its character as a system 
(contributing to) organizing social relations by special means or 
2. This conclusion is implicit in Soper's revised statement of the question: What is law that I 
should obey it? See alsop. 13 ("I believe that the phenomenon of prima facie obligation is univer-
sally associated with the institution of law .... "). 
3. P. 14. See generally ch. 6. 
734 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:732 
through the operation of special institutions. If it ought not to be 
obeyed then this too is due to those same facts. By identifying the law 
at the outset as a system we are obligated to obey, Soper does not 
advance the inquiry. He does not provide us with any considerations 
which may determine what ought to be done. We are offered by him 
the advice: If an act is required by law, then, other things being equal, 
we are obligated to perform it. But we pay a high price for it. We lose 
our grip on the question "what is required by law?" We thought, and 
Soper appears to endorse this thought (p. 2, and elsewhere), that at 
least the answer to this is clear. Law is a system of rules which are 
recognised and used by some or all of its subjects. We have ways of 
identifying the ways they do so. We may travel to Outer Mongolia, to 
Chile, to South Africa, to Uganda, or to any other country in the 
world. While being ignorant of many nice questions concerning its 
law we will find it rather easy to identify its central legal institutions 
and regulations. 
Not so if we accept Soper's basic maxim. This will require us first 
to establish whether those regulations ought, morally speaking, to be 
obeyed. Only if we are duty-bound to obey them (or perhaps only if 
that country's citizens are so obligated) are they law. The question of 
the existence of a moral obligation is not one we can answer simply by 
observing which are the country's legislative and judicial institutions. 
It is not a matter on which we can take the word of the country's 
lawyers or citizens as settling the issue. Even if they accept Soper's 
theory of law we cannot assume that their judgment of whether they 
are living under a legal system is trustworthy. It is quite posible that 
the vast majority of those subject to Nazi rule thought that Nazi rules 
ought to be obeyed. It is more than possible that if they did, they were 
badly in the wrong. 
If we follow Soper we will find that legal theory does not tell us 
what is the law of Germany or France or of any other country, for that 
. is not its job, nor does Soper claim that it is. But equally the views and 
conduct of the legal officials of those countries, the opinions and ac-
tions of its legal profession and of its citizens, will not determine what 
is its law. If the identity and content of the law of a country cannot be 
determined by reference to the opinions and conduct of the popula-
tion, the legal profession and the legal institutions of that country, 
then we are as far from knowing what we ought to do as we ever were. 
Soper's basic maxim, far from advancing our understanding of what 
we ought to do, blocks our way to answering that question. 
Where then did Soper go wrong? Why did he not see that the road 
to an answer to his main question, "what ought to be done?", goes 
through solving a whole series of subsidiary questions each of which 
advances us some of the way? We need to know the economic con-
comitants and the emotional make-up of monogamous marriages 
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before we can judge whether we ought to get married or not. We must 
establish the consequences of training in academic institutions and of 
apprenticeship methods of training before we can judge which form of 
training to prefer for ourselves or for others. Similarly, we ought to 
establish the prominent features of law as a political system before we 
can decide whether it ought to be obeyed. 
The methodological separateness of the question "what is the 
law?" from the question "ought it to be obeyed?" does not mean that 
the answer to the first does not advance the second. On the contrary, 
the first must be separate from the second in order to advance it. As I 
mentioned at the outset, Soper's mistake is to think that if the ques-
tions are separate they are unconnected. For him the view that one can 
provide a theory of what the law is without advance commitment to a 
particular answer to the question "ought it to be obeyed?" means that 
the theory of law is not in any way tied to the normative quest. This is 
a deep mistake. A theory of what the law is strives to identify its 
central, prominent, important features. What makes a feature promi-
nent or important or central is inescapably and inevitably an evalua-
tive question. It is important if it bears on what matters. In large 
measure it is precisely the fact that certain features are relevant to 
what one ought to do which marks their importance. 
It is crucial to remember, however, that we can and often do know 
that a feature of a scheme or an institution is relevant to its evaluation 
without knowing whether it makes it good or bad. The fact that pri-
mary education is compulsory is recognised by all as important to its 
evaluation, regardless of whether they take it to be one of the strengths 
or a weakness of our educational arrangements. 
In recent publications I have argued for a theory of law based on 
these methodological perceptions.4 But they are far from new. While 
not all the theorists generally identified as legal positivists endorsed 
them, they stood at the cradle of legal positivism. Bentham never dis-
guised the fact that his utilitarianism was the spring of some, though 
not of all, of his main jurisprudential doctrines. His doctrine of the 
individuation of laws and his views on the natural arrangement of the 
law, for example, are directly dependent on his utilitarian faith. Sig-
nificantly, both are designed to bring out aspects of the law which are 
of practical concern, without prejudging whether they show the law to 
be good or bad. 5 
A theory of law is, as Soper and others claim, tied to the normative 
quest. But the tie to be productive must be partial and indirect. Gen-
4. See THE CoNCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 213-16 (2d ed. 1980); THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 
37-52 (1979); Law, Authority and Morality, THE MONIST, forthcoming July, 1985; The Problem 
about the Nature of Law, 21 W. ONTARIO L. REv. 203 (1983). 
5. See J. BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (2d ed. London 1823) (1st ed. n.p. 
1776). 
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eral evaluative considerations inform us what features are relevant to 
the question "what ought one to do?". We then look to the law, as a 
social institution familiar in our culture, the likes of which is also to be 
found in other countries of different cultures, and see how it fares in 
terms of these features. Once that is done we have answered the ques-
tion "what is law?" in a way which advances our ability to decide 
whether we ought to obey it, without prejudging it. 
II. MISUNDERSTANDINGS 
The above simplified account of the way the normative quest af-
fects the theory of law is much too crude. But it serves to vindicate 
my opening remark that Soper's failure to see that the theoretical in-
quiry into the nature of law is indissolubly impregnated with evalua-
tive presuppositions leads him to misconceive the role such 
presuppositions should play in it. It also prevents him from seeing the 
force of theories he is most concerned to criticize. While I do not wish 
to comment in detail on Soper's review of the leading theories of to-
day, it is necessary to show how the distortion embedded in the basic 
maxim sometimes leads to misinterpretation. 
The task of criticism is discharged in chapter two. Its first half 
deals in some detail with several major tenets of Austin's, Kelsen's and 
Hart's legal theories (and with some views of mine). The second sum-
marises his critique of theories of this kind, introduces his own view 
and dismisses in a rather summary fashion both Fuller and Dworkin. 
Of the two the first half is by far the better. It displays the full 
power of Soper's mind, his penetrating insight which fastens on toes-
sentials, uncovers unstated presuppositions, and highlights connec-
tions and continuities in the various philosophical traditions. He 
writes for those familiar with the work of the theorists under consider-
ation. All those who have the required knowledge to appreciate his 
arguments will find the works discussed illuminated by the penetrating 
beam of Soper's searching gaze. And yet, unfortunately, even that im-
pressive discussion is marred by some important distortions and mis-
understandings. Let me give a few examples. 
Soper claims that Hart must justify his view that acceptance of the 
rule of recognition by the officials is a necessary feature of law by 
showing that this feature is important given human concerns and in-
terests. He thinks that Hart's answer "is the suggestion that the puz-
zled or ignorant person might want to conform to society's 
expectations regardless of accompanying sanctions" (p. 24). By this 
Soper means conformity for conformity's sake. This greatly distorts 
Hart's meaning. His point is that to understand society one has to see 
it as members of that society see it. Legal officials do not see them-
selves as gunmen writ large. They accept the system. That fact is 
understood in the society at large. This is not an empirical generaliza-
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tion but a conceptual truth. Law is a public institution the general 
features of which (i.e., the features which make it law) are known to 
the public (though the public may not think of them as the features 
which account for the legal character of the law). Hart does not spell 
out but takes for granted that we all know that the difference between 
an institution resting on acceptance and one resting on the threat of 
resort to physical force is relevant to many human concerns. Clearly 
whether one wishes to judge (morally or otherwise) the behaviour of 
the officials, or to judge the viability of the institution, or to judge its 
likely response to various contingencies, one would be greatly influ-
enced by whether it rests on acceptance or on force. 
Soper is right to say that the difference will be important to those 
subject to the law who wish to decide whether they ought to obey it. 
But Hart does not suggest that the difference is more important to the 
ignorant than to the wise, nor that it is relevant only to those whose 
instinct is to follow the herd. He was merely pointing out the exist-
ence of such people. Because they do exist an account oflaw is correct 
only if it makes room for them. An account based on a stronger no-
tion of recognition, one which claims that the law exists only if its 
subjects believe in moral reasons for the validity of its rules, is vitiated 
by not making room for such people. 
Soper's mistake is typical, for it shows how his single-minded con-
centration on the question of why one should obey the law blinds him 
to the existence of wider human interests. Similarly, his implied asser-
tion that according to Hart it is desirable that both officials and sub-
jects have "normative allegiance" to the law6 is a lapse which may 
betray a fundamental misunderstanding of Hart's theory. Hart does 
indeed say that acceptance of the rule of recognition by officials is a 
necessary feature of law. But he neither says nor implies that it is 
desirable that they or other members of the community should have 
this attitude. To say so is, according to Hart, not to explain the con-
cept of law but to commend the existence of law and to commend 
obedience to it wherever it exists. For all we know from Hart's theory 
of law he may be a radical anarchist who regards any attitude of nor-
mative allegiance as thoroughly immoral. 
Similar misunderstandings plague the second part of chapter two 
as well. They are aggravated by Soper's tendency to lump all the theo-
ries he disagrees with into one or two archetypes. Soper's adversary is 
the legal theorist or the positivist. It turns out that the positivist 
thinks that an obligation to obey cannot exist without coincidence of 
normative outlook (p. 40, and elsewhere). Soper agrees that this can-
not mean that the positivist believes that the law is to be obeyed only if 
it has some moral merit. Coincidence of normative outlook means 
agreement in judgment about the merit of a law; it means that one is 
6. See p. 38 (toward the foot of the page). 
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obligated to obey only laws which are just and good. I know of no one 
who held such a view. All the political and moral theorists I have any 
acquaintance with held that either consent or the fear that disobeying 
bad laws may lead to breakdown of law and order are grounds of 
obligation. 
It also appears to Soper that "the legal theorist's determination to 
remain neutral" on the question whether there is an obligation to obey 
"equates belief with reality: all that is necessary for a system to be 
normative in the appropriate legal sense is for officials to display the 
appropriate normative belief, however false or even insincere" (p. 49). 
If the appropriate legal sense of normativity means a moral obligation 
to obey the law then anyone who says that belief in an obligation en-
tails its existence is indeed guilty of confusing belief with reality. But 
he could hardly be accused of neutrality on the issue whether such an 
obligation exists. If, on the other hand, the legal sense of normativity 
is that the law is normative because it rests on acceptance, and not on 
force, then the theorist is neutral but far from confusing belief with 
reality he is at pains to keep them apart. 
Misunderstandings of the same kind appear elsewhere in the book. 
One example will serve. Soper seems to attribute to Kelsen the view 
that law differs from organised coercion because it rests on the general 
belief of the subject population in its justice (pp. 31, 95). But Kelsen 
was anxious to dissociate himself from such views. 7 The beauty and 
subtlety of Kelsen's view is that he believed that, like beauty, norma-
tivity is in the eye of the beholder. Those who interpret a coercive 
system as a system of law regard it as normative. They presuppose the 
basic norm, i.e., the rule that the law is valid and ought to be obeyed. 
Kelsen is uncommitted as to whether all or any of the law's subjects 
make this presupposition. It is not part of the conditions for the exist-
ence of law that they do, and certainly not that they should. 
III. A THEORY OF LAW 
I have claimed that the foundations of legal theory are necessarily 
value-laden and that this fact was recognised by some of the founding 
fathers of legal positivism. It was recognised by Bentham, who also 
saw that evaluative considerations may well lead to the endorsement 
of a value-free criterion for the identification of the law. What is law 
and what is not is a matter of fact. That it is a matter of fact is deter-
mined, in part, by evaluative considerations. Soper, I have claimed, 
makes the existence of law a moral question, and thus he contradicts 
his own view that what is law is determined by the views, attitudes and 
actions of those subject to the law. Examination of this point is neces-
7. See H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 7, 218 & n.83 (2d ed. 1967). 
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sary to vindicate my comments in section one, and will lead us into the 
heart of Soper's theory of law. 
Soper is aware that a theory of law which defines it as necessarily 
moral, that is, a theory of law based on what I described as his own 
basic maxim, is untenable. He distinguishes between his own theory 
and some other natural law theories: "Instead of defining law to en-
sure that it always obligates, one seeks an account that explains why it 
has any tendency to obligate at all. In this way an independent con-
cept of law is preserved, distinct from that of morality" (p. 59). I shall 
refer to this as Soper's methodological principle. As Soper himself 
observes, it is essentially the approach which I dubbed "the derivative 
approach":8 "That is, my claim is not that 'law' is itself a moral con-
cept, like 'justice,' but that, like 'promise,' it is identified by nonmoral 
features (supreme force and belief in justice) which necessarily have 
moral worth" (p. 92). 
Soper then proceeds to suggest that I reject the derivative ap-
proach. This is a mistake. While discussing various conditions that 
the derivative approach must meet, my purpose was neither to criticise 
nor to endorse it9 but to point out that it is compatible with some of 
the tenets of legal positivism. Indeed it is compatible with the only 
essentially positivist thesis that I was willing to endorse, namely the 
"sources thesis." The sources thesis asserts that the identification of 
the content and existence of the law is a matter of fact. This is pre-
cisely Soper's own assertion, or implication, in the two previous quota-
tions from his book. If his theory lived up to his own aspirations it 
could join the list of other natural law theories, like those of Fuller and 
Finnis, 10 which are compatible with the sources thesis, thus vindicat-
ing my claim that it is a mistake to think that the legal positivist and 
the natural law traditions are inherently incompatible. 
By endorsing the basic maxim Soper contradicts his own descrip-
tion of his own theory. He endorses the definitional approach which 
precisely does "define law to ensure that it always obligates." The 
tension between these two incompatible methodological positions 
shows at the heart of his explanation of law. 
The book contains a one page section entitled "A Theory of Law." 
Its distilled message is: "Legal systems are essentially characterised by 
8. The derivative approach regards the existence of law as a matter of fact and proceeds to 
argue that, given valid moral premises, the facts necessary for the existence of law assure it of 
some moral value. Whether or not this claim, strictly interpreted, is true, the thought of a legal 
system devoid of all moral merit is no less fantastic than the thought of a legal system which is 
perfect beyond improvement. It is surely the case that all legal systems have both merits and 
demerits. My objection was to the belief that if all legal systems have some moral merit then it 
follows that there is an obligation to obey them. See J. RAz, PRACTICAL REAsoN AND NORMS 
165-70 (1975). 
9. See id. 
10. See generally Soper, Legal Theory and the Problem of Definition, supra note 1 (review of 
J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980)). 
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the belief in value, the claim in good faith by those who rule that they 
do so in the interests of all . . . . Law combines the organised sanc-
tion with the claim to justice by those who wield the sanction" (p. 55). 
I shall follow Soper and will refer to the quotation as Soper's theory of 
law. Is this theory inconsistent with legal positivism as Soper claims? 
Since belief in value may be misplaced, since what a person believes is 
essentially on the factual side of the fact/value divide, the theory ap-
pears to be a positivistic one making the existence and contents of law 
depend exclusively on matters of fact. 
Compare, for example, Soper's theory oflaw with my views on the 
matter (which he regards as a species of positivism). I am not the first 
to have argued that "the law claims authority. The Law presents itself 
as a body of authoritative standards."11 Soper's theory seems to differ 
from my view in two respects. First, he claims whereas I do not that a 
system of rules is a legal one only if the people in authority believe in 
the claim to authority which the law makes. Second, he attributes to 
those in authority, and I do not, the belief that they govern in the 
interest of all. Of these (and the context of our respective remarks 
makes clear that they are the only) differences between these views of 
ours, the first is real but apparently insignificant, and the second, sig-
nificant but apparent only. Let me explain. 
Whatever mileage Soper hopes to make out of the first difference in 
constructing his argument for an obligation to obey the law, its real 
significance is minimal. He agrees that ordinary common sense is un-
likely to deny a legal system that status on the ground that its officials 
are all too often hypocritical in their profession ofbeliefin the value of 
the system they operate.12 It would be readily admitted on the one 
hand that a legal sytem all of whose officials are entirely and systemat-
ically hypocritical is a most unlikely possibility, and on the other hand 
that it is more than likely that in many countries some legal officials 
are hypocritical. Either way, whether it is an essential feature of law 
that its officials believe in its value or merely that they claim that they 
do, both properties are on the factual side of the fact/value distinction. 
Thus, the first difference between Soper and myself is apparently 
rather insignificant and fails to show where he deviates from well-
tested positivist paths.t3 
Soper's assertion that law exists only if the rulers claim to rule in 
the interests of the governed marks a more substantial disagreement 
between us. In arguing that a claim to a right to rule is a mark of law, 
I was mindful of the possibility of theocratic states whose governments 
govern in pursuit, as they see it, of divine commands and interests 
which may radically conflict with the interests of the governed. The 
11. J. RAz, 'THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 33 (1979). 
12. See, e.g., pp. 154-61. 
13. But see p. 742 infra for my explanation of why this appearance is misleading. 
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latter may be regarded as immaterial except when they coincide with 
the higher interests or happen to serve them. I was also aware of the 
theoretical possibility of a government coming to the conclusion, as 
did Moses regarding the whole generation of the Israelites in the de-
sert, that the interests of a whole generation have to be sacrificed for 
the sake of future generations. On a plain reading of Soper's theory of 
law (as explained on p. 55) such societies are not governed by law. 
They fail to qualify not because of the atrocities they perpetrate (re-
member that the sacrificial policies they pursue may be enthusiasti-
cally supported by the entire population), but because of the morality 
their rulers uphold. 
As the following chapters make clear, this important disagreement 
between Soper and me is only apparent. Soper notes that slaves and 
conquered people are often oppressed by regimes that believe in the 
justification of slavery and other forms of exploitation and oppression. 
Officials who accept the beliefs that underlie such moral judgments are 
acting in the interests of justice and fairness as they see it, and in that 
sense in the interests of all (including the disadvantaged group .... ) 
Thus, tempting though it may be to derive a substantive constraint from 
a theory that requires acting in the interests of all, the constraint is 
empty, as formal equality always is. [P. 121.] 
The temptation here mentioned is indeed to be resisted. But not for 
the reason stated. Soper seems to misunderstand his own theory. His 
theory of law does not establish a right that governments should act in 
the interest of the governed, nor does it establish a duty on them to do 
so. It merely claims that if they do not, then they are coercive orders 
rather than legal ones. He gives no reason to think that coercive or-
ders cannot do a lot of good, nor does he attempt to show that they are 
not, in some circumstances, preferable to legal orders. The fact that 
we all take for granted that normally the reverse is the case is neither 
here nor there. 
The temptation Soper mentions should indeed be resisted. But the 
interest of the passage I quoted lies elsewhere, for it withdraws the 
only aspect of his definition of law which separates his view from 
mine. Soper, it seems, has an idiosyncratic view of people's interests. 
It is a commonplace that morality sometimes calls on people to sacri-
fice their own interests for the sake of others. Soper disagrees. On the 
evidence of the passage quoted above, it appears that he thinks that a 
soldier who volunteers, out of moral conviction, to go to a certain 
death in order to save his friends is really pursuing his own interest, 
which happens to be to sacrifice himself.14 Given that understanding 
of people's interests, Soper's theory of law amounts to saying that 
14. Soper's argument at pp. 149-50 suggests that if my volunteer acts for other reasons he 
may not actually be pursuing his own self interest. Soper says there that a tyrant who puts his 
own interest above morality (which in the circumstances imagined requires him to rule in the 
interest of his subjects) is not acting in their interest even though he believes himself to be acting 
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"legal systems are essentially characterized by . . the claim in good 
faith by those who rule that they do so" (p. 55) in pursuit of valid 
moral principles (whether or not these serve the interest of the gov-
erned in the ordinary understanding of such interests). 
Am I saying that Soper's theory is really a familiar variant of legal 
positivist themes? Not quite. My claim is that the distinctive part of 
his theory of law is not in the doctrine he calls his theory of law but in 
his theory of natural rights. The latter theory is explained in chapter 
five, which is misleadingly entitled "Applications." In fact, this chap-
ter introduces for the first time a doctrine which, while being presup-
posed by the political principle explained in chapter three, is not 
supported by it. This doctrine lies at the heart of Soper's philosophy 
and is one of his two major novel theses in the book.15 
Natural rights "are rights against the state which can be invaded 
or ignored only at the cost oflosing the title oflaw" (p. 132). Note the 
accuracy of this explanation. Natural rights are moral rights, and to 
establish their validity as rights one resorts to moral argument; one 
consults, as it were, one's moral theory. Moral rights are natural ones 
because they coincide with the necessary conditions without which a 
social order is not a legal but a coercive one.16 Hence, the doctrine of 
natural rights reveals Soper's view of the necessary features of law. It, 
more than his theory of law, illuminates the difference, according to 
him, between a legal and a coercive order. 
Soper claims to discern two such rights: a right to "that minimum 
of security that underlies the judgment that any legal system is better 
than none" (p. 130), and a right to discourse (pp. 134-43). Soper says 
little about the content of his alleged natural rights. My main diffi-
culty is not, however, with their content but with the reasons for 
thinking that they are natural rights in the sense explained. 
So far as I can see Soper has one argument for the naturalness of 
the right to security and two in support of the naturalness of the right 
to discourse. I emphasise that naturalness is the only issue Soper dis-
cusses because his way of writing may mislead many readers into tak-
ing him to claim that he has established the existence of rights to 
correctly and justifiably. The difference is, presumably, that he does not think that it is morality 
which calls on him to prefer his interests to those of his subjects. 
15. I assume that his statement that the court is "an institution the primary function of 
which is to assume this responsibility of justifying the manner in which sanctions are imposed 
and disputes resolved" (p. 113) only sounds novel because of its rhetorical exaggeration. Pre-
sumably Soper would admit that the difference between a department of information and propa· 
ganda and a court is that while both explain the way sanctions are applied and disputes resolved, 
only the second applies sanctions and resolves disputes. 
Another controversial thesis he endorses is that "the essential difference between court and 
legislature consists in the constraint placed on the former, but not on the latter, to reach deci-
sions in accordance with preexisting (presumably legal) standards. Judges find the law; legisla-
tures make it" (p. 110). Unfortunately Soper does not explain or defend this claim. 
16. See pp. 130, 132. 
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security and discourse against all governments, rights which are le-
gally binding independently of any legislation or judicial recognition. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. Soper assumes without argu-
ment that people have rights to minimum security and to discourse 
against their government. He argues that these are natural rights, that 
is, that a government which violates them would be administering a 
system of coercion rather than law. But nowhere does he argue that 
natural rights are legal rights. All his argument purports to show is 
that the rights are not violated in law. But rights can remain inviolate 
without being recognised as rights. A country which does not have 
conscription, to give but one example, does not violate anyone's right 
of conscientious objection, assuming people have such a moral right. 
It does not follow that it recognises a legal right of conscientious ob-
jection. For all that Soper tells us neither of his natural rights need be 
legal rights. 
Let us tum to Soper's arguments for the naturalness of his two 
natural rights. The reason to regard the right to minimum security as 
a natural one is that without such security, having a system of law is 
no better than having no such system. Therefore, as we shall see be-
low, if there could be such a law undermining minimum security, 
there would be no obligation to obey it. This contradicts the basic 
maxim (i.e., that law is such that it is obligatory to obey it). Therefore 
there can be no such law. The startling aspect of this argument is that 
it flatly contradicts Soper's methodological principle. It now turns out 
that organised force and the rulers' belief in the moral rightness of 
their actions is not enough to assure a social order of legal status. It 
may still be nothing but a gunman situation writ large unless it also 
assures one of minimum security. 
Soper gives us no reason to believe that a social order meeting the 
only two conditions stipulated by his theory of law cannot infringe 
people's right to minimum security. On the contrary, he seems to rec-
ognize that it can do so.H He needs not a contingent argument, like 
Hart's, to the effect that law which systematically violates minimum 
security is unlikely to survive. He needs a conceptual argument estab-
lishing the conceptual impossibility of there being law which infringes 
the right to security. The only argument Soper makes is that one 
would not be obligated to obey it were it to exist. Thus, Soper is im-
paled on the horns of a dilemma. Either he gives up his methodologi-
cal principle and admits that his conception of natural law is 
definitional - he identifies the essential features of the law because of 
their moral significance, and their moral significance is his only reason 
for regarding them as essential to law. Or he has to abandon his basic 
maxim and concede that it is not necessarily the case that there is an 
17. Seep. 183 n. 15 & 17 (The case of slaves whose interests are sacrificed: for them no 
personal security is assured.). 
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obligation to obey the law. The question "what is law that I should 
obey it?" has no answer, for it rests on a false premise. 
Soper's arguments for the naturalness of the right to discourse fare 
no better. One relies on an empirical generalisation: rulers who deny 
the right to discourse are unlikely to be sincere believers in the moral 
rightness of their own actions (p. 135). Whatever one may think of 
this as an empirical generalisation is immaterial. The naturalness of 
the right can be established only by an exceptionless conceptual neces-
sity. The second argument is to the effect that denial of a right to 
discourse shows that the rulers do not respect their subjects (pp. 136-
40). This lack of respect absolves the subjects of the obligation to obey 
the law, according to the political theory to be discussed below. From 
here the argument is identical to that for the right to security. If there 
could be such a law it would be a law one is not obligated to obey. 
Therefore, it would contradict the basic maxim. Therefore it cannot 
exist. Violation of the right to discourse can be purchased, then, only 
at the price of losing the right to the title of law. Therefore, the right 
to discourse is a natural right. 
Given these premises, so it is. Unfortunately the premises land 
Soper again in the same dilemma. He must either drop his method-
ological principle and allow that he holds certain features to be essen-
tial for law for no other reason than that they endow it with moral 
value, or he must discard his basic maxim and allow for the existence 
of non-obligating law. 
It may be worth noting that Soper holds that respect for their sub-
jects is a conceptual condition of the sincerity of the rulers' belief in 
the moral justification of their actions. His notion of sincerity is such 
that it is impossible for rulers both sincerely to believe in the moral 
justification of their actions and to lack respect (that is, lack there-
spect which expresses itself in the right of discourse) for their subjects. 
So whether a person is sincere or not turns out not to be a matter of 
fact, but of morality. Something like the following may be a general-
ised statement of the principle Soper seems to presuppose: Only those 
who respect others are capable of having sincere beliefs on the moral-
ity of action affecting those others. Given this interpretation of sincer-
ity (though I am unclear as to why Soper adopts it), the first 
apparently innocuous difference between his theory of law and my 
view of the matter turns out to be of major significance. 
IV. THE OBLIGATION TO OBEY THE LAW 
It is plain, on the other hand, why Soper thinks that respect for the 
subjects is a condition of legality. His argument for an obligation to 
obey the law, the second major innovation of the book, depends on it. 
Three premises entail a prima facie obligation to obey the law (pp. 78, 
80): 
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(1) "[T]he enterprise of law in general- including the particular sys-
tem, defective though it may be, that confronts an individual- is better 
than no law at all." 
(2) There is "a good faith effort by those in charge to govern" in the 
light of valid moral principles. [This second premise understood in So-
per's special way includes, as we saw above, a further premise:] 
(3) The rulers respect the ruled. 
The advantage of law over no law at all is, according to Soper, that 
law secures minimum safety. He consciously endorses a Hobbesian 
position on this issue in order to make sure that he does not pitch his 
claim for the law too high. Much needs be said about Soper's prem-
ises. Having discussed them briefly in the previous section we should, 
however, press on. Do the premises support his conclusion? His con-
clusion is very far-reaching. It will establish not merely an obligation 
to obey the law in an essentially decent society; it reaches further and 
asserts an obligation to obey any legal system which observes his two 
natural rights. At times Soper makes it appear as if these conditions 
establish quite a lot, as if they establish mutuality of respect between 
rulers and their subjects and the genuine attempt by the rulers to fur-
ther the interests of all their subjects in a rational, reasoned and open-
minded way. Most of the time, however, Soper is cautious enough to 
warn against such a reading of his theory. Though law necessarily 
observes the two natural rights, they are very minimal. It appears, for 
example, that even Nazi Germany conformed to the conditions of le-
gality sufficiently to impose on most of its subjects an obligation to 
obey (p. 92). Can his meagre premises support so strong a conclusion? 
Can the obligation to obey depend to such an extent on the convictions 
of the rulers, regardless of the morality of their actions? 
Soper's basic idea is simple. There is a job that needs to be done, 
the job of government. Someone is faithfully trying to do it. Other 
things being equal, such a person deserves one's respect. So far so 
good. The problem starts when we try to understand why that respect 
involves an obligation to obey the law. I believe that Soper is trading 
on two recognised sources of respect and obligation. First there is re-
spect for an enterprise which is not merely a valuable enterprise, but 
also my enterprise. Every individual's attitude toward his own gov-
ernment should be not merely that they have a job which they are 
doing their best to carry out. There is a common enterprise in which 
both rulers and subjects should engage, the enterprise of promoting 
the good of the community. The rulers are trying to do their share. 
They may be failing, but at least they are trying in good faith. Their 
failure does not violate one's natural rights, and therefore has not de-
prived the common enterprise of all its point. It is in this spirit that 
Soper refers to respect for law based on "equal commitment to the 
search for truth and humility about the correctness of one's conclu-
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sions" (p. 82). 18 
The second recognised source of obligation Soper is invoking is the 
duty not to frustrate and upset people who are doing their best. They 
deserve that one should spare their feelings. The rulers would be hurt 
and offended if their best efforts on our behalf were to be met with 
rebuff in the form of disobedience. Therefore one is (prima facie) obli-
gated to obey in order to spare their feelings. In this vein, which 
dominates in the book, Soper observes that while "disobedience can-
not easily be linked to societal disintegration; . . . it can be linked in 
an ascending scale of sadness, disappointment, concern, anxiety, and 
fear on the part of those who think the laws are important and my 
obedience desirable" (p. 86). Therefore, the more they care about my 
compliance the stronger my duty is to comply (pp. 87, 153). 
I can see no way of merging these two underlying strands, if indeed 
I am right to find them in Soper's argument. Moreover, neither of 
them can support Soper's conclusion. Respect for law out of a sense 
of participation in a joint enterprise is, in its proper place, a real moral 
concern. It should indeed lead one to uphold laws which one finds to 
be less than ideal. One reason is the humility and the sense of one's 
own fallibility that Soper mentions. Another is the fact that, in many 
cases in which one's action makes a difference to a joint enterprise, one 
does more to promote the good and prevent evil by supporting the 
partners to that enterprise than by opposing them. Soper is aware that 
this last consideration cannot be the foundation of an obligation to 
obey the law, however weak. 
First, it is simply not the case that one's actions in breaking the law 
always make a difference to the enterprise. Quite often they do not. 
Furthermore, it is not necessarily the case that citizens and govern-
ments are engaged in a joint enterprise. The divergence of opinion 
about morality between me and a Nazi government or between me and 
a fundamentalist Muslim government is so great that I would deny 
that just because they believe in the rightness of their action there is 
some joint pursuit in which we are partners (assuming that I am their 
subject). 
Nor is Soper's argument from humility and fallibility any help. 
While aware of one's own fallibility one is also aware of the fallibility 
of the government. One should be cautious in believing oneself right 
and the rest of the world wrong, especially in matters in which others 
have greater expertise or experience or judgment. We discount our 
own opinions for such reasons many times every day. But we judge 
the action of others and their credentials before we trust them. Do the 
18. At times Soper sounds as if he sees the situation as one in which respect for law is merely 
the pursuit of long-term self-interest, see p. 84, but such passages are really concerned with the 
truth of the premises of his argument enumerated above. They are liable to mislead if read as 
explanations of why those premises support the conclusion. 
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considerations of humility show that one should support racist poli-
cies, even if only prima facie? Would not such support make one par-
ticipant to a racist enterprise? I confess that neither these nor any 
other examples can really carry the day against a claim that there is a 
prima facie obligation. All objections seem easy to deflect on the 
ground that they merely show that the obligation is overridden, not 
that it does not exist. But certain forms of racism and other iniquities 
perpetrated by legal systems all over the world, even those which meet 
Soper's conditions oflegality, are such that the very belief that one has 
a prima facie obligation to go along with them makes one guilty 'by 
association. 
Ultimately the first source of obligation, participation in a joint 
enterprise, fails to establish an obligation to obey, for such participa-
tion merely requires doing that which contributes to the success of the 
enterprise. But Soper argues for an obligation to obey those whose 
actions lead to the failure of the enterprise. Respect for them as joint 
entrepreneurs requires frustrating them rather than obeying them. A 
sense of a shared enterprise gives one license to act against one's part-
ner's wishes where but for the partnership one would not be allowed to 
interfere. If we go on an expedition together, I may be entitled to use 
force to restrain you from some very damaging action which will lead 
to the expedition's failure even though I may not use the same means 
to save a stranger from failure in an enterprise of which I am not a 
part. This explains why citizens care more than foreigners about evils 
perpetrated by their own government even when they do not suffer 
from them. It explains why citizens feel free to engage in civil disobe-
dience whereas visiting foreigners do not. Respect arising out of the 
existence of a joint enterprise may actually undermine any obligation 
to obey an unjust government rather than support it. 
Soper's second source of obligation, the need to spare the feelings 
of the rulers, 19 is both too strong and too weak to serve as a founda-
tion of an obligation to obey the law. It is too weak because it applies 
19. In a footnote Soper explains: "I have cast the theory in terms of respect for 'those in 
charge' only because that is the limiting case of law; in most cases, those who accept the system 
and thus deserve respect will include citizens as well as officials." P. 179 n.36. Naturally the 
argument has to hold in the limiting case if it is to be valid at all. That is why Soper concentrates 
on the limiting case, and why I commented on it in those terms. Paradoxically Soper fails to 
notice that the conditions which he rightly regards as normal, i.e., in which sections of the popu-
lation share the attitude of those in charge, do not strengthen his argument at all. The respect for 
the rulers, he claims, is based on the fact that they are the rulers, that they do their best to carry 
out a necessary job. By-standers may share the values and attitude of the rulers. But being by-
standers they do not deserve that respect. (It is arguable that voters, or at least those who actu-
ally vote, are themselves among the rulers. J. Austin, for example, held that the British sovereign 
is not Parliament but those who have a right to elect it. I am not arguing who should count as a 
ruler. My only concern is with the claim that similar respect is owed to members of the public 
who share the attitude of the rulers toward the law.) They do, of course, deserve the respect that 
is due to all humanity. But then it does not matter that they are citizens of one's own country. 
On that argument the population of Poland ought to obey the laws of Poland in order not to hurt 
the feelings of Chemenko, or those of the commander-in-chief of the Soviet army. Most of the 
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only to law-breaking acts the commission of which will be or is likely 
to become known to the officials. Right now, sitting by myself in the 
study late at night, I can think of some dozen offences I can commit 
within the next half hour of which no one will know if I choose not to 
let my secret out. Besides, the vast majority of violations of law are 
infringements of private rights. The overwhelming majority of these 
will never reach official notice, and were always known to be most 
unlikely to do so. 
In any event, Soper's argument applies only if the rulers mind if 
their laws are not obeyed. I do indeed hope that they do mind. I 
myself, and almost everyone I know, mind if valuable laws are reck-
lessly disregarded or deliberately flouted. If Soper does not count the 
need to spare my feelings as a ground for an obligation to obey the law 
this is presumably because I am not involved in the legal system in the 
way which will make my feelings count. But if so it is reasonable to 
assume that one should give special consideration only to those feel-
ings of the rulers which result from the fact that they make and en-
force the law, the feelings which are not shared by ordinary citizens. 
(One would not feel obliged, for example, to spare the rulers' feelings 
in private matters entirely unconnected with their official functions 
just because their official functions obligate us to spare their feelings.) 
One should, in other words, avoid engendering feelings of unap-
preciated or frustrated authorship (which distinguishes the rulers from 
the rest of us). One may well doubt, however, whether such feelings 
are widespread among the rulers. Many of them are just doing a job. 
They care about success or failure. But one would have to be very 
presumptuous to assume that one's petty violations would make a dif-
ference to their feelings, or that they are likely to make such a 
difference. 
Another thought is relevant here. Do we really want to encourage 
the sort of feelings that Soper's argument presupposes? It is true that 
we do not like "the unthinking invocation of ritual and rote" (p. 153). 
But for myself I would replace it with a dedication to the task coupled 
with a sense of moral responsibility, and would shy away from the 
personal involvement which leads to continuous frustrations when 
others fail to do as one wishes. This last attitude on which Soper mod-
els his political theory is both undesirable and, luckily, rarer than he 
thinks. 
Soper's argument is too strong because it does not apply to the law 
alone. Much governmental business nowadays is carried out not by 
the use of public law powers but through the conduct of economic 
policies. Those have little to do with the achievement of minimum 
security for people. Nor do most laws have much to do with that task. 
points I make in the text against the argument from respect to the rulers apply to any arguments 
based on respect to those who share their views as well. 
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If it is better to have law, however imperfect, than to have no law at 
all, then it is also better to have government, even with imperfect poli-
cies, than to have no government at all. So if there is prima facie 
obligation to obey the law, there is also a prima facie obligation to 
follow government policy recommendations. If the President advises 
all employees to forgo any wage demands in the coming year, then 
there is a prima facie obligation to do so. There can be little doubt 
that in a case like this he will be frustrated and upset if people do not 
take his advice. I venture to regard this as a reductio ad absurdum of 
Soper's argument. 
CONCLUSION 
There is much in the book that I did not mention. In particular I 
did not comment on the excellence of many of Soper's critical discus-
sions. His discussion of the frequent abuse of considerations of cer-
tainty (pp. 102-07), for example, should be taken to heart by all the 
positivists and realists who all too often rely on the need for certainty 
in a most unthinking manner. While focusing on the book's novel 
ideas I could not do full justice to its value in stimulating discussion 
and re-examination of old ideas. I failed to discuss Soper's use of para-
digms and his revival of the provocative paradigm of parental relations 
as a model of political authority. There is much in the book to delight 
as well as to infuriate. This reader's ultimate conclusion is, however, 
that Soper has failed to make good his aspiration to provide us with a 
cogent new theory of law and political obligation.20 
20. I am grateful to Kent Greenawalt for letting me see his co=ents on chapter three, to be 
published in the proceedings of the March 1984 Hart conference in Jerusalem. 
SOURCES OF LAW, LEGAL CHANGE, AND AMBIGUITY. By Alan Wat-
son. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1984. Pp. xviii, 
164. $22.50. 
Sources of Law, Legal Change, and Ambiguity, by Alan Watson, 1 is 
a valuable and ambitious discussion of the "sources of law" - how 
law is developed and what authority gives it legitimacy. The first half 
of the book discusses methods of lawmaking at various points in Euro-
pean history, while the second concerns problems of lawmaking in 
modern England and makes proposals for radical reform. Both halves 
share a single thesis: that inadequate and uncertain sources of law in 
Western society have often caused confusion as to what the law is. 
Unfortunately, Professor Watson's treatment, spanning twenty-
two centuries in 131 pages of text, is too brief and too cursory to do 
justice either to the subject or to the author's own provocative ideas. 
The result is two incongruous halves uneasily pasted together rather 
than a seamless whole. Furthermore, the second half- especially the 
author's proposal for a new system of law - is especially vulnerable to 
criticism. 
The "sources of law" of which Watson writes include custom, leg-
islation, scholarly writing, and judicial precedent.2 The general line of 
his argument is clear: these sources of law are often inadequate and 
unclear, and lawyers and others have paid insufficient attention to im-
proving them. One of his examples of this inadequacy is the legislative 
system of England (and, by analogy, that of the United States), in 
which old, outmoded laws are retained because the legislature does not 
have the will to agree on new laws (p. 83). A related example is the 
legislative habit of passing statutes with broad, often ambiguous lan-
guage (because it is easier to secure a majority this way), and leaving it 
to the courts to divine the legislative "intent" behind the language -
even though there really was no such -"intent," and many of the legis-
lators voting for a bill may not even have read it (pp. 78, 80). Conse-
quently, there is much confusion as to what the law is and from whom 
it comes. 
In arguing that this problem is by no means new, Watson draws on 
examples from ancient Rome, from Germany and northern France in 
the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries, and from Italy, France, and 
1. Professor of Law and Classical Studies, University of Pennsylvania, and editor of a forth-
coming English edition of Justinian's Digest. 
2. Unfortunately, the author is not always entirely clear what he means by such terms. For 
example, "custom" as he uses the phrase is extremely difficult to define. It is something other 
than merely prevailing moral values (p. xii), but it does appear to have something to do with 
popular feelings and usages, pp. 22, 37- which need not, however, be current usages but may be 
relics of past beliefs. P. 27. 
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Scotland in the seventeenth century. In all of these examples, 
problems resulted when a jurisdiction sought to formulate its laws, 
especially when the jurisdiction sought to use custom (whether its own 
or another's) or the laws of another jurisdiction. 
In imperial Rome, Watson notes, confusion about the sources of 
law was partly caused by the fact that works which had the force of 
law were rarely collected and difficult to find, so that even lawyers did 
not have access to them (pp. 16-17). In medieval Germany and north-
ern France, law was almost wholly customary and local. Custom, 
however, is often hard to discern and leaves many gaps, creating a 
legal vacuum, which in Germany was filled in part by Spiegels (books 
discussing the legal customs of a specific place). These books were 
privately produced, yet often considered authoritative even outside of 
the place covered - oddly, since the laws treated by the books were 
based solely on the custom of the jurisdiction covered (pp. 26, 28). The 
failure of custom to provide sufficient legal guidance in a jurisdiction 
thus led it to adopt the customs of other jurisdictions. Furthermore, 
in time the Spiegels came to be treated as a kind of code, which would 
override custom itself (p. 38) -thus making one jurisdiction's custom 
subservient to that of another area. 
Another way in which the legal vacuum was filled was the practice 
of some towns of carrying over intact the body of law of another town 
(even when that other town was not politically dominant). The body 
of law adopted would itself be essentially the custom of the "mother" 
town; the "daughter" town would not only adopt this custom but rely 
on interpretations of the law by experts in the "mother" town. Ad-
ding to the confusion was the fact that the mother town's law was 
often unwritten - indeed, such law was in many cases written down 
for the first time by the experts, or Schoffen, only in response to ques-
tions from the "daughter" town as to what the latter's own law was 
(pp. 35, 39). The value of custom as a source of law is that it reflects 
and is adaptable to local usage and belief, yet in the case of both the 
Spiegels and the "mother-daughter" arrangements, jurisdictions 
adopted the custom of other areas, partly because their own customs 
were inadequate in that they were not known or written down. 
In medieval France, there were frequent attempts to remedy the 
inadequacies of custom by writing them down. Once these customs 
were written out, however, they tended to become established as if 
they were statutes, thereby lessening the values of adaptability and 
compatibility with local usage (pp. 44, 48, 101). Even though the cus-
toms were written down, there remained a need for other sources of 
law, yet these alternative sources were sometimes ludicrously dis-
guised. One French legal compiler, in clarifying the French law, sim-
ply carried over the old Roman law but, to give it authority, attributed 
it to French sources (p. 47). 
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In seventeenth-century Italy, lack of sufficient local law contrib-
uted to the use of Roman law and of the "law of neighboring places," 
a group often broadly defined to include France and Spain. Use of 
Roman law, however, led to confusion because the Latin of the Ro-
man legal authorities was neither that of the classical authors nor that 
of educated seventeenth-century ltalians.3 The "law of neighboring 
places," meanwhile, was extremely difficult to find and raised further 
language problems. Moreover, since there was no systematic ranking 
of other legal systems, its use gave great discretion to the judge to use 
whatever law he favored. 
Watson perceives a common problem in these examples: the inad-
equacies of existing law create a vacuum which leads to the often un-
thinking adoption of other inadequate law in an attempt to fill the 
gaps. Examples include the ready adoption of the Spiegels and of 
"mother" towns' laws in medieval Germany, the significance accorded 
Lord Stair's Institutions in eighteenth-century Scotland (p. 74), and a 
frequent demand for codification as a way to clarify and simplify the 
law. The replacements, however, were themselves rarely satisfactory: 
Watson notes, for example, that "codification once complete, law be-
gins to sink back into complexity and ambiguity" (p. 97). 
Watson's overview of the problem of legal sources in European 
history is an impressive performance, but a flawed one. For some peri-
ods, notably seventeenth-century Italy, he relies too heavily on the 
work of a few authors, and sometimes strains to make rather bland 
quotations carry a greater freight of significance than they can easily 
bear.4 For some areas, such as ancient Rome, it may be that there are 
just not enough sources extant for an exhaustive study; the author's 
twenty-four pages on the subject span eight centuries. If this is the 
case, however, it would be better to face up to it rather than to pretend 
that one can accurately discern, from a handful of texts, a society's 
attitudes toward many issues over a long period. Finally, Watson does 
not always translate his quotations into graceful (or even grammatical) 
English. One quotation is rendered as: "we relied upon God who in 
the magnitude of his goodness can gift and bring to fulfillment 
achievements deeply desperate" (p. 94). 
It is, however, the second half of the book - dealing with modem 
England and with Watson's scheme for a new system of law- that is 
most vulnerable to attack. First, while a paucity of materials may jus-
tify briefer treatment of ancient Rome than is desirable, the same can-
not be said of nineteenth-century England. Yet the author, having an 
3. Indeed, one polemicist argued for the use of Italian in the law on the ground that, being 
clearer and better understood than Latin, its use would give rise to less litigation. P. 57. 
4. See, e.g., pp. 4 (in which a two-sentence joke by Cicero becomes a major source on Ro-
mans' attitude toward legal authority), 60 (in which a single contemporary treatise becomes vir-
tually the sole important authority Watson uses in discussing seventeenth-century Italy). 
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opportunity to delve into the riches of English legal history, and ex-
pressly disclaiming a desire to deal with the present (p. 77), prefers to 
write, in pamphlet-like tones, about Harold Wilson's Minister of 
Housing and Local Government, and how impossible it is to get any-
thing through parliament nowadays. 
Watson's scheme for a new system of law is still less satisfactory. 
He proposes a system of "two-tier law" which he believes would en-
hance the law's comprehensibility, comprehensiveness, and respon-
siveness to community values and social change (p. 112). Under this 
system, the focus would be on the legislature rather than on the judici-
ary. An interpretive committee, mainly of legal experts, would draft, 
and the legislature ratify, two types of law: a code of "first-tier law," 
which would be accessible to the layman and would seek to make the 
law clear to nonlawyers; and a "second-tier law," which would be a 
thorough, comprehensive commentary on the first-tier law, and which 
itself would have the force of statute but, unlike modem statutes, 
would deal in much greater depth with the reasoning behind the law 
and with possible applications to hypothetical situations. In Watson's 
system, the courts would be limited to applying the very detailed codi-
fication and would have no judicial precedent and no direct citation of 
scholarship (p. 113). 
Professor Watson somewhat uncharitably observes that his pro-
posal has no chance of being enacted because of the selfishness and 
self-interest of the legal profession (p. 131). Another possible reason is 
that it is an inherently unworkable scheme. It may seem quaint to 
hand over the writing of laws to a group of legal scholars who would 
sit down and write up works with the force of law. This, however, is 
in itself not a very difficult notion to accept, since it is essentially how 
the Uniform Commercial Code, for example, originated. The prob-
lem, rather, lies in Watson's belief that such law could be drafted so as 
to be considerably more comprehensible than it is now, and so that it 
could significantly reduce the role of judges in producing the law. 
The first-tier law, for example, would be aimed specifically at non-
lawyers (p. 126), but it would be supplemented by the second-tier law 
and overridden by it when the second-tier law is directly on point.5 
Therefore, even if the first-tier law is extremely clear, it could mislead 
the citizen who does not know the second-tier law. Indeed, the 
clearer, simpler, and shorter the first-tier law is, the greater its likely 
divergence from the more complex and specific second-tier law. Con-
versely, the more accurate the first-tier law is, the less likely it is that it 
could be communicated effectively to the nonlawyer. It may be that in 
a complex society, law is necessarily complex, and it is an unhappy 
thing to imagine trying to explain amorphous standards such as "rea-
5. Presumably the extremely difficult issue (not dealt with by Watson) of whether the second-
tier law is "on point" would be decided by the judges. 
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sonableness" to the layperson in such a way that it will both be under-
stood by the nonlawyer and be accurate enough to be codified law. 
But there are still graver practical obstacles to the plan. Watson 
himself acknowledges that it is extremely difficult to pass any law in a 
legislature, and still more difficult to get legislators to agree on a com-
mon reason for passing it. Legislators, therefore, are often intention-
ally obscure in their drafting, so as to attract the largest number of 
other legislators to support the bill for often contradictory reasons, 
and, by eliminating unneeded specificity, to avoid antagonizing voters. 
Difficult as it is to pass laws under that system, it would be far more 
difficult to persuade a majority of legislators to agree on a thorough 
treatise having the force of law, discussing in detail how the law will 
apply to specific situations, and describing the reasons why the law 
should be so. 
This problem is compounded by the fact that the Interpretive 
Committee itself would probably have enormous trouble agreeing, and 
a treatise approved by the committee on a three-to-two vote would be 
unlikely to find much deference in the legislature. The Committee 
might be able to agree (or to win legislative ratification) only by ob-
scuring the language and blurring differences; the temptation to leave 
the real problems to the judges would remain. 6 
Thus, even if the author's proposal were put into effect, it would be 
likely to lead naturally to a system with many of the defects of our 
own: broad, general statutory language, promulgated because more 
specific proposals were too controversial, and supplemented by a 
plethora of exceptions. Therefore, while Professor Watson may be cor-
rect in arguing that the currently existing sources of law are unsatis-
factory, he has failed to show that his own preferred alternative would 
be an improvement. 
6. Any expectation that the statutes passed would be free of inconsistencies should be tem-
pered by knowledge of the Ameriqan Law Institute's experiences in drafting restatements. Faced 
with a dispute between Williston and Corbin on whether consideration should be required for an 
enforceable contract, the Restaters of Contracts chose simply to include both views, in sections 
75 and 90. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CoNTRACT 60-65 (1974). 
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LAW, MORALITY, AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES. By Terry 
Nardin. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1983. Pp. xii, 
350. Cloth, $35; paper $14.50. 
This unusual book is at once an attempt to revise and refine the 
nineteenth-century conception of international relations and an argu-
ment for its moral superiority to some prominent recent theories of the 
international system. Professor Nardin, an associate professor of 
political science at the State University of New York in Buffalo, claims 
that the statements of shared purposes in the United Nations Charter 
and in the programs of movements like the New International Eco-
nomic Order misstate the basis for international association and 
misapprehend the nature of moral conduct in international affairs. 
Professor Nardin's argument falls short in several respects and his 
tone is occasionally a bit strident, but this spirited defense of a contro-
versial position should stimulate discussion among theorists of inter-
national law and jurisprudence. 
Nardin begins by positing a distinction between "purposive" and 
"practical" associations of states. Purposive associations exist to fur-
ther shared goals or ends: the abolitionist movement in America was 
an example of a purposive association of individuals dedicated to end-
ing slavery. Practical associations, on the other hand, are based on 
rules or practices that are "proper to be observed in acting, regardless 
of one's end" (p. 8). One example of a practical association might be a 
debating society, in which the members may not share any political 
goals but are willing to follow common rules of debate. 
Nardin argues that international society is emphatically the latter 
kind of association, a practical association of states based on a few 
shared rules and practices. It is "an association of independent and 
diverse political communities, each devoted to its own ends and its 
own conception of the good, often related to one another by nothing 
more than the fragile ties of a common tradition of diplomacy" (p. 19). 
He rejects the idea that states associate with other states in order to 
further goals of world peace or economic justice, arguing that such a 
notion is logically incomplete, historically inaccurate, and morally 
questionable. 
Nardin's argument from logic is not very satisfying. For Nardin, 
the purposive conception of international society is logically incom-
plete because its proponents "forget that any international agreement 
presupposes commonly acknowledged rules and procedures according 
to which agreements can be made" (p. 24). 1 The idea here is that no 
1. This classic formalist argument appears in different guises again and again in the book. 
See, e.g., p. 172 ("Pacta sunt servanda is a rule of customary international law and not itself the 
product of explicit agreement, for if it were one would have to ask why the agreement to respect 
agreements should itself be respected."); p. 194 ("The view that there is no law apart from what 
officials decide is indeed self-contradictory, for the very idea of an official presupposes rules ac-
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association can be purely purposive: some kind of practical associa-
tion, some set of rules independent of the common goals and accepted 
by all, must lie behind a purposive association if it is to act at all. Even 
an anarchists' convention needs procedural laws, or else no one can 
say when the group has agreed. Yet this does not prove that interna-
tional society is not purposive -just that it must be practical as well. 
Nardin's developed theory of the practical association of states must 
go beyond this weak formalism. 
Professor Nardin's historical and political argument is stronger: 
the "practical" conception of international society can better account 
for the actual diversity of ends in the world and can generally provide 
a more satisfactory explanation of international law. His analysis of 
the history of international relations is perhaps the most interesting 
and valuable section in the book. Nardin combines intellectual and 
social history by exploring the tension between practical and purposive 
conceptions of international law both in the theories of Kant and Ben-
tham and in the actual workings of nineteenth-century and twentieth-
century international organizations. His treatment of the Concert of 
Europe (pp. 86-97) is particularly good. Historians have viewed the 
Concert as both an instrument of collective interests and as a set of 
practices designed to achieve security and stability among nineteenth-
century European states regardless of their individual goals. The early 
congresses of the Concert can be seen as purposive efforts to advance 
the shared goal of monarchical rule, but they were also practical ef-
forts to preserve the European states system by promoting legitimate 
monarchy in inost - but not all2 - countries. Nardin suggests that 
the Concert maintained an essentially practical character even late in 
its history, when theories of world community and shared goals were 
on the rise. He states that, "although it was colored by successive ver-
sions of the view that it existed to promote the shared purposes of its 
members, it never entirely shed its character as a forum for setting 
limits to the conduct of sovereign powers whose national pride, preoc-
cupation with security, and competitive rivalry stood as evidence of 
their divergent purposes" (p. 96). This descriptive passage seems close 
to Nardin's idea of what an important international organization 
should be. 
Nardin's treatment of the League of Nations and the United Na-
tions is more problematic, and his rather surprising conclusion that 
the United Nations represents a more radical departure from tradi-
tional forms of international relations than does the League relies too 
much on a very formal reading of the United Nations Charter. 
cording to which public offices are created, their lawful incumbents identified, and the scope of 
their jurisdiction delimited."). 
2. Nardin notes that the rights of nonmonarchical states like the Swiss Republic were pro· 
tected as well. See p. 89. 
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Nardin writes that the United Nations "is really an attempt to estab-
lish a new regime in which states, associated on the basis of an agree-
ment to pursue together certain specified substantive ends, will follow 
the directives of the body that is set up to organize the pursuit of these 
ends" (p. 107). Nardin may be right that such an attempt was made; 
five Secretaries-General would agree that it did not succeed. 
The heart of Nardin's book is his attempt to show that the practi-
cal conception of international society is compatible with traditional 
theories of international law. First, Nardin seeks to establish that in-
ternational law is law, arguing that legislation, enforcement, and a 
common judge are only contingent features of law and that their ap-
parent absence in the international system does not negate the exis-
tence or obligatory nature of international law. Yet Nardin's 
treatment of the problem of enforcement is disturbingly casual: 
First, we must dispose of what is now generally agreed to be the most 
egregious error made by Austin concerning the relation between enforce-
ment and law. . . . That one agent is able by force to compel another to 
act in a certain manner can hardly mean the first has right to demand 
such conduct, nor can it mean that the second has a duty or obligation to 
comply. . . . Coercion alone cannot create rights or obligations of any 
sort, legal or nonlegal. On the contrary, enforcement presupposes the 
validity of the law that is enforced. 3 
This is unpersuasive. It is not quite so clear that Austin was wrong 
that law must carry sanctions to be law, and Nardin's argument does 
not inspire confidence. Austin could reply that any sense of obligation 
to obey the law other than fear of sanction is a contingent feature of 
law, and that coercion does oblige a person to obey if she wishes to 
avoid the sanction. That is, law need not be morally binding to be 
considered "law." In any case, Nardin's argument that enforcement is 
not a sufficient condition for law - "Coercion alone cannot create 
rights" (p. 126) - does not prove that enforcement is not a necessary 
component. 
Nardin next attempts to delimit the specific character of the inter-
nationallegal system. He argues that international law is largely cus-
tomary law, created not intentionally but rather as "the indirect 
consequence of innumerable and substantively motivated acts, deci-
sions, and policies" (pp. 166-67). Empirical investigation and induc-
tive reasoning are needed to determine whether a particular norm is a 
valid international law: there is no "rule of recognition," in H.L.A. 
Hart's terms. According to Nardin, "Customary international law 
arises wherever there exists a general or uniform practice together 
with the general acceptance of this practice as law" (p. 167). 
There are two related problems with this conception of interna-
tional law. First, Nardin does not explain how international legal 
3. Pp. 125-26 (emphasis in original). 
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rules change.4 Second, Nardin's model will not be very helpful to 
someone who wants to predict whether particular acts of one country 
are likely to be accompanied by strong sanctions, weak sanctions, or 
no sanctions at all from the international community. The Soviet in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia was followed not by superpower confronta-
tion, but by the first stirrings of detente. The Soviet invasion of 
Mghanistan had very different consequences, and Nardin's model can-
not explain why.s 
Nardin ends his book with an argument for the moral superiority 
of the practical conception of international society. The fact that the 
rules and practices of international law are limited in number and 
scope allows the world's societies to remain diverse and encourages 
self-determination. Yet surely other values are lost. A system of inter-
national law premised on the formal equality of states that aims only 
to place a few restrictions on international conduct will do little to 
overcome the dire poverty of the developing countries and little to 
equalize the real power of nations. Perhaps it is unrealistic to suggest 
that the countries of the world can engage in a purposive association 
to bring about these changes, but Nardin comes uncomfortably close 
to justifying the status quo. 
AMERICA'S UNWRITIEN CONSTITUTION: SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND 
POLITICAL ~PONSIBILITY. By Don K. Price. Baton Rouge: Louisi-
ana State University Press. 1983. Pp. xvi, 202. $19.95. 
Don K. Price1 has arrived at a time of life when he could be for-
given for indulging an impluse to recapitulate or even simply to reprint 
previously published views, perhaps prefacing such a work with a brief 
essay highlighting the continuing relevance of any relatively dated the-
ories and placing the various pieces in proper historical context. In 
4. Nardin writes: 
The rules of customary international law are a distillation of the constantly changing prac-
tices of states, and they reflect the collective will of the international community only in the 
sense that certain patterns of conduct from time to time attain a degree of acceptance suffi-
cient for them to be acknowledged as a distinct practice entitled to govern future conduct. 
P. 167. Nardin completely fails to explain how the changing practices of states attain this degree 
of acceptance or why accepted practices fall into disrepute. 
5. Both the problem of change and the likelihood of sanctions in the area of international 
relations are treated with sophistication by Professor Myres S. McDougal and his colleagues at 
the Yale Law School. See generally M. McDOUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 
(1960); Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication (1981) (April 24, 
1981) (unpublished Harold D. Lasswell Memorial Lecture). 
1. Emeritus professor of government and of public management, Kennedy School of Govern-
ment, Harvard University. 
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this volume,Z Price has done both more and less than this. On the one 
hand, he has reappraised virtually all of the major issues encountered 
in a long career of service to government, private foundations, and 
universities, and has forged them into a thoughtful analysis of Ameri-
can political policymaking. On the other hand, he has done all this in 
a single concise and readable volume that bespeaks a greater concern 
with reaching and influencing a contemporary audience than with pre-
serving the form of past publications. 
The conciseness of his work is suitable in that Price's main concern 
is the "roots of the incoherence of policy which lead[s] many critics to 
wish to amend the U.S. Constitution" (p. 9).3 The "incoherence of 
policy" itself Price generally takes to be self-evident; the nature of the 
perceived problem must be inferred from the proposed solutions.4 The 
focus of the book is rather the underlying intellectual and social struc-
tures which determine whether our governmental institutions are ca-
pable of formulating coherent, unified policies. Price asks: "[H]ow 
can we know what we should do and how we should do it and how we 
may hold government responsible? That is to say, what is the authori-
tative source of truth on which we should rely" (p. 4)? These questions 
raise broad and inherently amorphous issues, which it would be only 
too easy to talk around at great length without achieving useful insight 
or reform. Accordingly, Price dispenses with an extensive analytic 
and bibliographic apparatus, saying, "The issues here are too broad to 
be dealt with by the precise methods of the scientific study of politics 
and society, but the stakes are high enough to discourage professional 
timidity" (p. 14). To strike at the roots of incoherence, in other words, 
one must at times run the risk of appearing opinionated and 
conclusory. 
In Price's case, any such appearance would be somewhat decep-
tive, for the groundwork for these opinions and conclusions has in fact 
been laid by his previously published works, spanning more than four 
decades. The thesis, for example, that America's "unwritten constitu-
tion" - "the fixed political customs that have developed without for-
mal Constitutional amendment, but that have been authorized by 
statute or frozen, at least temporarily, in tradition" (p. 9) - ought to 
be the focus of reform, derives significant support from Price's early 
work. In the late 1930's, Price coauthored a series of studies on the 
efficacy of the "city manager" form of government in selected cities. 
2. This book has also been reviewed by Genuth, Book Review, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC 
SCIENTISTS, Mar. 1984, at 43. 
3. An extreme manifestation of this tendency is the ongoing effort to call a constitutional 
convention in order to pass a balanced budget amendment. See The Constitution as Cudgel, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 6, 1982, at 22, col. 1. 
4. Price's proposals presume that a coherent policy is not simply one that leads to cost-
effective or nonduplicative programs. It also sets forth clear and specific goals with which voters 
can agree or disagree so that the act of voting is as meaningful as possible. 
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The city manager was seen at the time "as America's most promising 
illustration of the need to separate management cleanly from policy 
interests in the interest of economy and efficiency" (p. 172). Yet, de-
tailed empirical study at times turned up cases such as that of Jackson, 
Michigan: "The theory of the city manager plan has never been gener-
ally understood in Jackson. . . . Old political habits continued un-
changed from one form of government to the other, making it 
impossible under either for the electorate to exercise much control 
over the policies of the administration."5 
Price was already well-educated to perceive the importance of "old 
political habits" by study (begun as a Rhodes Scholar in the early 
1930's) of the United Kingdom's unwritten parliamentary constitu-
tion. 6 The central lesson derived from these early studies is that new 
written rules alone will never change "old political habits," and that 
the key to political reform is "to command a consensus between the 
major political parties . . . [that] would amount to an agreement on 
how the unwritten constitution of the United States should operate" 
(p. 128). 
These and other earlier studies are incorporated by reference in the 
instant work, primarily by the device of prefacing each chapter's foot-
notes with "reminiscences of the personal experiences which were re-
sponsible . . . for the opinions and prejudices that show through any 
scholarly work" (p. 153). The result is two books bound in one cover 
-the first a scholarly discourse, the second, in essence, Price's (abbre-
viated) memoirs. The use of this device reveals not only the sort of 
authority ultimately relied upon in this book, but, in a sense, the sort 
of authority Price suggests ought ultimately to be relied upon by gov-
ernment itself. Thus, a central conclusion of the book is that decisions 
on "[t]he more important issues that arise at the higher levels of the 
governmental hierarchy . . . ought to be controlled in the end not by 
scientific data or predetermined rules but by moral and political judg-
ment, guided in tum by a concern for the general welfare" (p. 143). 
Readers may perhaps be satisfied by less rigorous documentation 
when their author's "moral and political judgment" seems sound. It is 
less clear that citizens in a democracy should be encouraged to defer in 
a comparable way to government officials by entrusting a select cadre 
of them with the "substance of policy" (p. 80). By analogy to the 
British civil service, however, Price proposes just such an institution:' 
"a career service heading the major departments of a government, 
with lifetime commitments and a common outlook or education and at 
S. H. STONE, D. PRICE & K. STONE, CrrY MANAGER GOVERNMENT IN JACKSON (MICHl· 
GAN) 48 (Pub. Admin. Serv. No. SP.13, 1939). 
6. See Price, The Parliamentary System, 3 PuB. Ao. REv. 317 (1943). 
7. An especially formative experience with regard to this proposal was Price's service on 
former President Hoover's Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch. 
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least partly beyond political control" (p. 76). By "common educa-
tion," he means that these civil servants would be "generalists" as op-
posed to legal and scientific experts. 8 Price's suggestions for creating 
this establishment within government include decreasing the number 
and type of congressional checks on agencies and programs, creating 
cabinet committees with genuine authority to formulate policy away 
from the media spotlight, decreasing the numbers of political appoin-
tees, and reducing staff size in Congress and.the Executive Office of the 
President. 
In Price's view, giving the executive more freedom to act is the best 
way to make government more accountable to the people. His new 
version of the unwritten constitution would call for a disciplined Con-
gress, in which party leaders are able to deliver or withhold support 
and maintain a firm party line, to delegate to the president enough 
authority to carry out and coordinate the laws. A streamlined execu-
tive office, in turn, sets the overall goals of policy and delegates author-
ity, through the cabinet, to a cadre of depoliticized professionals who 
independently work out and execute the government's programs. Ac-
countability is assured both by the more direct causal link between 
voters and government action and by the more coherent manner in 
which the business of government is carried out: "In ideal terms, this 
is the more democratic and responsible arrangement since it focuses 
the attention of the electorate and Congress as a whole on the main 
general issues, which they are interested in and competent to decide, 
rather than on technical or procedural details, which they are not" (p. 
141). 
Thus, Price's direct answers to the difficult question he poses are 
quite striking. The "authoritative source of truth on which we should 
rely" in setting national policy is not religion (the written Constitution 
prevents this), not science (which the unwritten constitution has rele-
gated to a role similar to that of religion), and not law (which is not a 
source of truth at all, but at best a codification of truths arrived at by 
other means). It may be objected that the "moral and political judg-
ment" Price posits instead as the ultimate policymaking guide is not 
an "authoritative source of truth" either, but rather a name for the 
kind of comprehensive and disinterested review of goals and antici-
pated effects that ideally takes place before any government program is 
implemented. Nonetheless, Price argues that it is a failure to defer to 
expertise in this mode of analysis which has fostered, in recent years, a 
"partly scientistic and partly legalistic" (p. 93) approach to lawmaking 
that precludes coherent and responsible government. 
8. Nonetheless, it would probably not be unreasonable to envision this elite corps as people 
very much like Price's students at the Kennedy School of Government. In terms of existing 
governmental structures, the recently instituted Senior Executive Service is positioned to become 
such a corps, but would have to be expanded and modified significantly to meet Price's criteria. 
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Attempts to legislate scientific goals directly, without tempering 
the scientists' "abstract and specialized view of the truth" (p. 58) with 
a measured sense of priorities, results in programs that are liable to be 
partially or wholly counterproductive.9 At the same time, the legalis-
tic tendency to curb abuse of power through extensive congressional 
oversight of agencies and programs splinters democratic responsibility 
in the legislature and removes accountability from the president and 
the departments. 
The American voters' manifest preference for the genial generalist 
Ronald Reagan over both the scrupulous scientist Jimmy Carter and 
Washington lawyer Walter Mondale illustrates the timeliness, if not 
necessarily the accuracy, of Price's critique. The voters' acceptance of 
a president who seems to rely upon his own moral and political judg-
ment in preference to detailed technical knowledge in his decisionmak-
ing does not, however, indicate a willingness to permit an unelected 
bureaucracy similarly to set its own policy. On the contrary, at pre-
sent there appears to be a durable consensus against the creation of a 
new and powerful entrenched establishment within the federal govern-
ment. Price confronts this objection directly, acknowledging the exis-
tence of a deep-seated American "prejudice against establishments" 
and loathing for bureaucracy (p. 77). He goes even further, and sets 
up an analogy between our theological past, with its antiestablishment 
bias, and our scientific present, typified by a deep attachment to aca-
demic freedom. In this scheme, absolute, unyielding truths may moti-
vate political action so long as religious and scientific institutions are 
not part of the government, nor so closely allied with government as to 
dictate results inconsistent with democracy and justice. Having ratified 
this American prejudice insofar as it extends to established religion 
and science, 10 Price maintains that we should not carry our prejudice 
against establishments to the extreme of banishing policy-making ex-
pertise from government. Rather, we should see to it that there is an 
institution firmly implanted in the government which can preserve co-
herence, fairness, and continuity in the execution of the laws. 
Once a viable solution is paired in the public's mind with a press-
ing need, a consensus that changes the unwritten constitution may 
well arise with surprising speed. While it may be easier to command a 
consensus upon some of Price's proposals than others, they are all 
worthy of consideration, and their presentation serves to make them 
appear neither more nor less significant than they actually are. 
9. The original and detailed form of this argument may be found in D. PRICE, GOVERN-
MENT AND SCIENCE: THEIR DYNAMIC RELATION IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1954); D. 
PRICE, THE SCIENTIFIC EsTATE (1965). 
10. An example of established science is the Soviet Academy of Sciences, which, Price ob-
serves, "in its complete dependence on government authority and support and its dedication to a 
quasi-scientific ideology that justifies absolute authority, is rather like the old Russian Orthodox 
church in its relation to the czars." Pp. 11-12. 
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As a final point, it is perhaps also significant that Price's thought is 
characterized by a pervasive, unpolarized dualism: Though fond of 
thinking in two's, Price never thinks in opposites. As a youth, he was 
driven to inquire into the necessity of having two Methodist Episcopal 
churches in one small Virginia town, and was gratified to be told, 
"Why, of course, we have to have one church for the Republican 
Methodists and one for the Democrat Methodists" (p. 154). In a field 
whose broadest conceivable distinction seems to be that often elusive 
contrast between Republican and Democrat, this fascination with con-
templating the profound differences between two things that are very 
much alike - mayors and city managers, British and American gov-
ernment, personal prejudice and scholarly predilection - is surely a 
valuable trait. Imagine his intellectual thrill when his Oxford tutor 
told him: "You American students never seem to understand. . . . 
Merton College has no rule against climbing into the college after mid-
night. It has a very strict rule against getting caught climbing into the 
college after midnight" (p. 159). 
THE DILEMMAS OF INDIVIDUALISM: STATUS, LIBERTY, AND AMER-
ICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. By Michael J. Phillips. Westport, 
Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1983. Pp. x, 226. $29.95. 
Sometime in the near future, the individual in the United States 
will become subject to increasingly harsh and repressive denials of 
freedom- or so says Michael J. Phillips1 in The Dilemmas of Individ-
ualism: Status, Liberty, and American Constitutional Law (p. 200). 
Ironically, the principal reason for the transformation of America into 
an authoritarian regime will be liberalism, through its emphasis on 
individual freedom (pp. 165-66): 
It would be inaccurate to identify the "liberalism" to which Phil-
lips refers with any particular political group. Instead, Phillips' liber-
alism "is a body of ideas dominating the entire American political 
spectrum" (p. vii). The central goal of liberalism as Phillips describes 
it is the emancipation of individuals from all restraints on their ability 
to act (pp. 153-56). To achieve this end, liberal freedom must accom-
plish two things. First, it must remove physical and cultural obstacles 
to individual freedom of choice. Second, it must confer upon individu-
als the capacity to exercise the options available to them. According 
to Phillips, the logical conclusion of this sort of liberty is either ran-
dom or suicidal behavior (pp. 156-58). 
1. Michael J. Phillips is an Associate Professor of Business Law at Indiana University's 
School of Business. He holds a J.D. degree from Columbia University, and LL.M. and S.J.D. 
degrees from the National Law Center at George Washington University. 
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Thus, liberal freedom must always be tempered with restraining 
influences (p. 161). Phillips contends that the communitarian influ-
ences of family, region, religion, morality, and the like no longer pro-
vide any meaningful limitation on the self-destructive aspects of 
liberalism, because their continued vitality depends upon prejudicial 
treatment of certain groups. For example, Phillips asserts that discrim-
ination against women and children "[i]s vital to, if not constitutive of, 
the family and the stabilizing and socializing functions it fulfill[s]," 
with "the opprobrium visitd [sic] upon homosexuals and illegitimates" 
also contributing (p. 164). Similarly, he states that black slavery and 
the banishment of American Indians to reservations were elements "of 
a social hierarchy that, if nothing else, was ordered" (p. 164). Finally, 
the disabilities imposed upon all of these groups "also tended to rein-
force the values of localism and community by putting some restraints 
on social and geographical mobility" (p. 164). In sum, Phillips sees 
prejudice as "reflecting and to some degree forming, a variegated pat-
tern of social ordering" (p. 163). Since liberalism, through the equal 
protection clause of the Constitution, prohibits discrimination, it has 
destroyed the ability of communitarianism to guide society.2 
In the absence of communitarian values liberalism must seek re-
straints elsewhere. Phillips interprets the growth of government, cor-
porations, labor unions, and other large organizations as the response 
to that need (pp. 167-72).3 These institutions fail to provide a viable 
substitute for the lost community (pp. 164-74), so American society 
will instead avoid the self-destructive tendencies of liberalism through 
increasing institutional oppression of individuals (pp. 94-96), which 
will ultimately take the form of direct control of thought by use of 
drugs, behavior modification, and "electrical and chemical stimulation 
of the brain" (pp. 200-07). 
Confronted with a vision as radical and apocalyptic as this, the 
reader expects Phillips to propose a "coherent system of alternative 
moral possibilities," but Phillips disappoints this expectation "because 
[he has] no such scheme to offer." Instead, he explicitly adopts a "de-
scriptive posture" (p. ix), asserting that there is no escape from the 
script he has recited (pp. 199-200). Phillips palliates his projection by 
claiming that "it is fairly optimistic" because the alternatives, nuclear 
war, economic ruin, or environmental disintegration, are even worse 
(p. 207).4 
Although some of Phillips' reasoning invites dispute - for exam-
2. Note that Phillips neither acknowledges that the equal protection clause bars only arbi-
trary and irrational discrimination, see, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 
681 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting), nor considers the possibility that this limitation on the reach 
of equal protection doctrine might provide the necessary restraint. 
3. Phillips contends that individuals have essentially identical relationships with all large 
institutions, and that it is therefore unnecessary to distinguish among them. See pp. 69-120. 
4. See also p. 196 ("subordination to Russian designs"). 
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pie, he ignores alternative explanations for the phenomena he ob-
serves, such as the impact of technology on the growth of modem 
institutions5 - his rhetorical method forces the reader to question his 
motives. Throughout his book, Phillips relentlessly distances himself 
from the text, using at least four tricks. First, he couches his argu-
ment in opaque, confusing jargon. 6 Second, he continually uses weak 
phrasing in order to express his positions in an equivocal manner.7 
Third, he attributes many of his statements to unspecified third par-
ties. 8 Finally, he argues via proxy, presenting the writings of great phi-
losophers (most frequently Hegel,9 Hobbes, 10 and Plato11) in lieu of 
his own. By riding on the coattails of these formidable thinkers, Phil-
lips lends his writing a false aura of legitimacy12 and avoids responsi-
bility for his arguments. 
5. P. 167 (institutions have grown in order to provide their members with "competitive ad-
vantages and increased power," to facilitate the "urge toward the domination and exploitation of 
nature," and to fulfill "the need for some alternative form of community"). Phillips' argument is 
fundamentally incomplete, see notes 20-22 infra and accompanying text, so there is little to be 
gained by responding to its substantive shortcomings. 
6. The most important examples are provided by his use of the terms "freedom" and "sta-
tus." According to Phillips, there are three varieties of freedom: "negative freedom," pp. 3-4; 
"authoritarian positive freedom," pp. 9-12; and "liberal positive freedom," p. 13; and two types 
of status, "ascribed" and "achieved." P. 8. His work largely depends on the manipulation of 
these five terms. One example of Phillips' use of jargon is as follows: "In one version of this 
status-positive freedom fusion, ascribed statuses are very significant." P. 10 (footnote omitted). 
Phillips burdens other concepts with unnecessarily weighty labels, see, e.g., p. 202 ("corporate 
state paradigm"), and forces his reader to digest complex terminology even where a more com-
mon word would be unambiguous. See, e.g., p. 206 ("ESB and neuropsychopharmacology" in-
stead of "drugs"). 
7. See, e.g., p. 6 (supporting a point by claiming that it "is not self-evidently false"); p. 30 
("[t]oo often, it appears"); p. 72 ("tend to support"); p. 98 ("may come to involve"). 
8. See, e.g., p. 89 ("some contend"); p. 96 ("often said"). 
9. See, e.g., pp. 168-69. 
10. See, e.g., pp. 184-85. 
11. See, e.g., pp. 189-93. These three are the only writers Phillips discusses at any length, but 
he lists other prominent figures when it serves his purpose. See, e.g., p. 5 ("Saint Paul, the Stoics, 
Kant"). 
12. Phillips' disregard of philosophical writings contrary to his position undermines the abil-
ity of his citations to legitimate his work. For example, Phillips uses the theories of Thomas 
Hobbes to justify his assertion that liberalism leads to totalitarian government. After certifying 
Hobbes' liberal credentials (and Hobbes, along with John Locke, is acknowledged as one of the 
two originators of the liberal tradition), Phillips paraphrases Hobbes' conclusion that " '[t]he 
absolute power of the sovereign . . . was really the necessary complement to . . . individual-
ism.'" P. 184 (quoting G. SABINE, A HISTORY OF PoLmCAL THEORY 475 (1961)). 
Phillips neglects, however, to respond to the works of Locke. Like Hobbes, Locke presumes 
that humanity consists of free individuals. J. LoCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 309 
(1960). The individualism of Locke, contrary to that of Hobbes and Phillips, does not require 
state repression. In fact, Locke explicitly denounces authoritarian forms of government: "Free-
dom from Absolute, Arbitrary Power, is so necessary to, and closely joyned with a Man's Preser-
vation, that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his Preservation and Life together." J. 
LocKE, supra, at 325 (emphasis in original). American political theory draws largely on the 
philosophy of Locke, not Hobbes. Since ·one of Locke's primary purposes was to debunk Hob-
bes' authoritarian theory, A. GUTMANN, LIBERAL EQUALITY 19-20, 27-32 (1980), Phillips can-
not make effective use of Hobbes without also responding to Locke. 
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Phillips bases much of his book on the ground broken by the Con-
ference on Critical Legal Studies, but perverts its teachings in the pro-
cess. Like Phillips, the Critical Legal scholars point out the 
bankruptcy of unqualified liberalism as a means of social organization 
and the fundamental contradiction between liberal individualism and 
communitarian values. 13 Phillips parts with them, however, when he 
asserts that a society must choose either freedom or community (pp. 
198-99) and attacks reduced discrimination brought about by enforce-
ment of the equal protection clause.14 
To this end, Phillips allots much of his work to describing and 
denouncing the law of equal protection (pp. 19-67, 151-64). For exam-
ple, he opposes due process in juvenile criminal proceedings, student 
rights, and equal access to contraception and abortion for minors (p. 
27). He believes that government should control the development of 
children (p. 30), and that discriminatory treatment is necessary to en-
sure that children mature in the manner prescribed by the state (p. 
25). He makes similar arguments as to women (pp. 20-24) and 
blacks.15 
Phillips devotes substantial effort to deprecating affirmative action 
(pp. 121-52, 174-78), even though he acknowledges that this criticism 
provides little support for his thesis (p. 175). He never mentions the 
term "affirmative action," but uses the pejorative expression "reverse 
discrimination" instead.16 He bases his blanket condemnation17 on 
13. Compare, e.g., p. 175 (liberal individualism is self-contradictory), with Kennedy, The 
Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 209, 211 (1979) ("Most partici-
pants in American legal culture believe that the goal of individual freedom is at the same time 
dependent on and incompatible with the communal coercive action that is necessary to achieve 
it."). 
14. In contrast, members of Critical Legal Studies emphatically believe that society can in· 
corporate a commitment to both individual freedom and communitarian values. See, e.g., 
Horowitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1423, 1427-28 
(1982) (law must incorporate both individualism and communitarianism); Kennedy, supra note 
13, at 217 (individual liberty and state coercion can be fused in civil society); Tushnet, Following 
the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 
781, 785-86 (1983) (liberalism is an incomplete social theory, but 'just as conservatism correctly 
emphasizes our mutual dependence, liberalism correctly emphasizes our individuality and the 
threats we pose to each other. It may be that we live in a world of tension, in which no unified 
social theory but only a dialogue between liberalism and conservatism is possible."). In fact, one 
purpose of their criticism is to engineer a better synthesis of these ideals. See, e.g., Kennedy, 
For.m and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685, 1710 (1976) ("What 
we need is a way to relate the values intrinsic to form to the values we try to achieve through 
form.") (emphasis in original); Kennedy, supra note 13, at 221. But see Gabel & Kennedy, Roll 
Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1, IS (1984). 
Professor Alan David Freeman addresses the points Phillips raises more specifically. He 
insists that the law can integrate equality and justice and criticizes the law for its failure to do so. 
See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical 
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1103, 1119 (1978). 
15. See text following note 16 infra. 
16. See, e.g., p. 174. 
17. Phillips criticizes every area of affirmative action law: education, pp. 134-35, 138-41; em· 
ployment, pp. 135-38; and voting, pp. 142-45. 
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the belief that, occasionally laudable purposes18 notwithstanding, af-
firmative action constitutes "odious" discrimination (p. 176) and is 
merely a "concession to minority political power" created in response 
to a "thoroughly egoistic group struggle" (p. 178).19 Phillips also con-
tends that commitment to affirmative action will cause the government 
to take increasingly severe measures to ensure equality, culminating in 
"genetic engineering" (p. 177). Ultimately, Phillips hopes for a catas-
trophe engendering an "authoritarian" backlash that abolishes affir-
mative action (p. 177). 
In essence, Phillips argues that liberalism run amok will compel 
American society to choose among a few intolerable alternatives: sui-
cide, incoherence, or tyranny involving government-sponsored drug 
addiction and eugenics. Moreover, he claims that the triumph of lib-
eralism depends upon rejection of communitarian values, which is in 
turn caused by enforcement of the equal protection clause. A reader 
accepting this reasoning is likely to decide that rejecting equal protec-
tion might restore communitarianism and avert the occurrence of 
Phillips' frightening predictions. Phillips supports this conclusion by 
advocating that contemporary society should impose sacrifices on mi-
norities and stating his regret that America's representative democ-
racy presents obstacles to such a program (p. 197). In this light 
Phillips' actual purpose, which is quite different from his stated de-
scriptive intent, becomes clear: The Dilemmas of Individualism is a 
manifesto for the repudiation of the equal protection clause that goes 
beyond rejecting affirmative action, and actually advocates restoring 
the most reprehensible varieties of public and private discrimination. 
Phillips does not even renounce the view that slavery is the social con-
dition for which blacks are most suited, condemning that institution 
only for its excesses (p. 31). 
Unfortunately, Phillips lacks the audacity to state his thesis boldly 
and defend it forthrightly.20 In adopting his indirect argumentative 
style, Phillips avoids the most important questions. First, he never 
considers the possibility that liberty and community might be harmo-
nized. 21 Second, even if the two cannot coexist, Phillips does not at-
18. Phillips concedes that preferential treatment may sometimes be justifiable to remedy past 
injustice and to develop true equality of opportunity. Pp. 132-34. 
19. Even if affirmative action is necessary to implement the desired enhancement of the pro-
ductive capabilities of minority group members, Phillips argues, liberalism will probably destroy 
the "nurturing" and "constructive" aspects of the doctrine. P. 178. 
20. Phillips' caution in this respect also explains his efforts to dissociate himself from his 
writing. See text at notes 6-12 supra. 
21. If the law can resolve the conflict between individual and community and avoid the disas-
trous consequences of that conflict, as Critical Legal Studies teaches, then there is no need to 
eviscerate the equal protection clause. The Critical Legal scholars predicate their argument on 
the discord between individualistic and communitarian goals, but, directly contrary to Phillips, 
argue for legal militancy on behalf of distributive justice. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 13; 
Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REv. 829, 849-57 (1983) (critical 
theory seeks to expose, destroy, and replace contract law because it encourages wealthy parties to 
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tempt to prove that constitutionally mandated equality is the root of 
the conflict. 22 Phillips does himself and his reader a disservice by his 
failure to address these pivotal issues, for this shortcoming makes his 
startling views neither convincing nor credible, and relegates his book 
to the status of an extremist novelty. 
PASSION: AN EsSAY ON PERSONALITY. By Roberto Mangabeira Un-
ger. New York: The Free Press. 1984. Pp. ix, 300. $14.95. 
Western philosophical thought has moved from the metaphysical 
to the nihilistic, and in Passion Roberto Unger wants to reconcile the 
two. Unger notes that "[t]wo great themes" comprise the focus of 
metaphysical "thought about personality": the central value of inter-
personal relationships, especially love, and the continuous assault on 
particular societies, to express the belief that human beings are inher-
ently unable to find perfect satisfaction on earth (p. 24). The first 
theme has not disappeared from human experience, claims Unger, for 
it is only through relationships with other free and "insatiable beings 
like ourselves" that we are able to find fulfillment (p. 25). But the 
second theme eliminates the possibility of discovering meaning in the 
real world, by positing instead an extra-human, ideal realm. Radical 
modernism, embracing the nihilistic, rescues the metaphysical tradi-
tion from viewing human existence as merely an earthly metaphor of 
an absent ideal, but just as it recognizes that we are what we make 
ourselves to be, radical modernism concludes wearily that "the indi-
vidual can expect no real progress" (p. 36) from such a continuous 
reshaping of the self. The possibility of discovering meaning on earth 
disappears altogether in this extreme skepticism. 
Roberto Unger, who teaches law and social theory at Harvard 
University, believes that a form of social life can be developed which 
will better enable us to become fully human, which to him means a 
society where institutions are structured primarily to promote per-
sonal freedom and change, and in Passion he points toward this goal in 
the realm of interpersonal relations. In an earlier article, The Critical 
exert power over poorer parties); Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. 
L. REv. 1276, 1295-96 (1984) ("Bureaucracy is ... a primary target for those who seek libera-
tion from modem forms of human domination. . • . Critical theory seeks to undermine" its 
existing legal basis and foster individual liberty.); Klare, Contracts Jurisprudence and the First-
Year Casebook, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 876, 896-98 (1979) (law cannot succeed unless it takes steps 
to reduce the influence of advantaged parties in "our highly stratified, class-dominated society"); 
Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REv. 753, 771-72 (1981) (contract law 
cannot accommodate true freedom without rejecting the premises of present law). 
22. Phillips' approach logically requires this result, but he does not explicitly propose re-
jecting the ideal of equality. 
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Legal Studies Movement, 1 Unger described this goal in the field of 
legal systems; in a reported forthcoming work, he will do so in social 
theory. Unger recognizes that the "systematic shift in the character of 
direct personal relations"2 which he discusses in Passion "need[s] to be 
thought out in legal categories and protected by legal rights,"3 a task 
he began undertaking in The Critical Legal Studies Movement. "[N]ot 
to give these reconstructed forms of solidarity and subjectivity institu-
tional support would be . . . merely to abandon them to entrenched 
forms of human connection at war with our ideals."4 Likewise, an 
"indispensable counterpart to a psychology of empowerment" (p. 75), 
which Unger describes as enabling people to discover novel ways of 
relating with others (p. 73), "is a social theory capable of describing 
the forms of social life that advance the practical, passionate, and cog-
nitive forms of empowerment" (p. 75), which Unger undoubtedly will 
elaborate in his forthcoming social theory. But the discussions oflegal 
systems and social theory are in a sense secondary, for they depend 
upon a notion of what it means to be a human being, a notion which is 
expounded in Passion. 
Although he accepts the modernist conception that people are de-
fined by their" social and historical contexts, Unger's view of what it 
means to be a human being cuts across specific social and historical 
barriers and consists of a universal claim: all human beings - no 
matter when or where they live - must cope with the tension between 
our need for and our fear of one another, which Unger calls "the prob-
lem of solidarity" (p. 4). "Passion" is "the living out" of this tension 
(p. 115), which, though unresolvable, is eased to varying degrees by 
the many different passions (p. 125). Much of the book involves de-
scriptions of these passions, detailing their relative successes and fail-
ures in alleviating the conflict between our need for and fear of each 
other. 
In Unger's hierarchy of passions, it is love which best allows us to 
embrace others without apprehension: 
Love is an impulse toward acceptance of the other person, less in his 
distinctive physical and moral traits (which the lover may criticize and 
devalue) than in his whole individuality. The specific features of the per-
son are never irrelevant - how else could you know him? - but they 
are taken as incarnations of a self that both speaks through them and 
transcends them. This acceptance, made in the face of the inexorably 
hidden and threatening being of another person, always has something of 
the miraculous. It is an act of grace devoid of condescension or resent-
ment. [P. 221.)5 
1. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 561 (1983). 
2. /d. at 598. 
3. /d. 
4. /d. 
5. Both Freud and Hegel appear to have influenced Unger's discussion of love: 
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For Unger, when we love, we break down defenses, vulnerabilities, 
socially circumscribed barriers to appreciating other people. As we 
ourselves learn to play with the possibilities of being human, as we 
discover a multiplicity of ways of reinventing and recombining the ele-
ments that make up our otherwise unchanging character, we begin to 
see that other people are like us because they can do the same. 
Although we cannot reach an extra-human Utopia, we can find images 
of that ideal realm in our own lives by recognizing and uncovering the 
infinite possibilities that human freedom can provide. Thus, in Un-
ger's view, the form of social life which would best enable us to be-
come fully human is that form which is most malleable, which we see 
as itself contingent. This form leaves us the greatest room for play: 
An order must be invented that, considered from one standpoint, mini-
mizes the obstacles to our experiments in problem-solving and in ac-
cepted vulnerability and, viewed from another perspective, multiplies the 
instruments and opportunities for its own revision. Such an order repre-
sents the next best thing to the unconditional context whose unavailabil-
ity helps make us what we are. Its characterological form is a central 
concern of this inquiry . . . . [P. 193.]6 
A crude but helpful description of Unger's best society would un-
derstand it as procedural rather than substantive. That is, the best 
society is one in which we can most easily open ourselves to others 
with the least amount of fear - this society is best because of how it 
enables us to act, not what it enables us to be. 7 Unger is careful, 
though, in both Passion and The Critical Legal Studies Movement, to 
disassociate his theory from theories of abrupt and violent revolution, 
which are only necessary to shatter the harsh intransigence of a society 
which fails to allow for change. Unger's best society would contain 
Normally, there is nothing of which we are more certain than the feeling of our self, of our 
own ego. This ego appears to us as something autonomous and unitary, marked off dis-
tinctly from everything else. • • . [T]owards the outside . • • the ego seems to maintain 
clear and sharp lines of demarcation. There is only one state • . • in which it does not do 
this. At the height of being in love the boundary between ego and object threatens to melt 
away. Against all the evidence of his senses, a man who is in love declares that 'I' and 'you' 
are one, and is prepared to behave as if it were a fact. 
S. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 12-13 (J. Strachey ed. 1961) (footnotes omit-
ted). See also G. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT~ 184, at 112 (A. Miller trans. 1977) 
(emphasis in original): 
[Self-consciousness] is aware that it at once is, and is not, another consciousness, and equally 
that this other is for itself only when it supersedes itself as being for itself, and is for itself 
only in the being-for-self of the other ••.. They recognize themselves as mutually recogniz· 
ing one another. 
6. The legal aspect of this possible order is described in The Critical Legal Studies Movement 
as "deviationist doctrine." Unger, supra note 2, at 576-83. This "enlarged doctrine" 
is the legal-theoretical concomitant to a social theory [and a theory of interpersonal rela-
tions] that sees transformative possibilities built into the very mechanisms of social stabiliza-
tion and that refuses to explain the established forms of society, or the sequence of these 
forms in history, as primarily reflecting practical or psychological imperatives. 
Id. at 583. 
7. Cf J. CoNRAD, LoRD JIM 212-15 (Stein discussing "how to be"). 
February 1985] Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy 771 
self-corrective mechanisms because its inhabitants would see it as a 
laboratory for possibilities of human interaction, and be ready to laugh 
at rather than defend a failed program. 
That Unger's best society would be a place of playfulness and 
laughter is, however, only implicit in Passion, and Unger's failure to 
describe the mirthfulness of the world of love exemplifies the specula-
tive tone that marks the central failure of the work as a whole. For 
although Unger claims that his mode of discourse will be that of the 
storyteller (p. 84), his stories are more generic than specific. He dis-
cusses, abstractly, lust, despair, hatred, vanity, jealousy, envy, faith, 
hope, and love, without once posing a hypothetical tale to situate the 
discussion in the lives of real or imagined people. 8 Only once, when he 
embarks upon a "biographical genealogy of the passions" (p. 147), 
does Unger move toward a specific example. His lovely discussion of 
the development of the passionate self9 reminds one substantively of 
Piaget's description of the development of the child, 10 but even here 
Unger is rarely able to tell real tales. II 
Unger also tends to think dualistically; the cornerstone of Passion 
is itself a dichotomy, that of our mutual longing for and fear of each 
other. But Unger would probably acknowledge that his method of 
thought is not meant to imply an ontological assertion. Unger recog-
nizes that although we often discuss our relations by reducing them to 
easily graspable conceptual categories, our relations themselves are 
complex and not dualistic. 
The publication of Passion seems to mark an important moment in 
post-modernist thought. Although human is all we can be, we none-
theless yearn for more, and the post-modernist task is to find represen-
tations of the infinite in the real. The most fertile ground for such 
representations is humanity itself. We cannot reach godliness, but as 
Roberto Unger's Passion so trenchantly demonstrates, we can reach 
each other, if only we can learn to overcome who we are and envision 
the possibilities of who we might become. 
8. For examples of helpful story-telling in philosophical discourse, see J. SARTRE, BEING 
AND NOTHINGNESS 40-42, 96-98, 101-03 (H. Barnes trans. 1956). For further elaboration of this 
feature of Unger's work, see Teachout, Book Review, 83 MICH. L. REv. 849, 883-90 (1985) (in 
this issue). 
9. For example, when Unger describes a child's "beginning of reflection upon contingency-
the discovery that things might be otherwise," p. 154, he first writes of a child's crying for his 
parents. Then Unger widens his interpretive focus to incorporate in the crying the child's devel-
oping though still unconscious sense of his mortality: "If only he could think more clearly, he 
would not stop crying when father comes home." P. 154. 
10. See generally THE EssENTIAL PIAGET (H. Gruber & J. Voneche eds. 1977). 
11. Unger's description of the turniiig points in the development of the passionate self is 
general rather than specific. That is, Unger rarely sets forth a hypothetical situation to represent 
a larger idea. 
